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This thesis analyses the causes and evolution of the conflict in the Republic of 
Moldova and capabilities of three conflict-regulating mechanisms to facilitate the final 
political solution of this conflict. The leading cause of the conflict is the competition 
among post-Soviet politicians, fighting over the division of the Soviet state and 
redistribution of politico-economic benefits. In their fight for power, the elites mobilized 
instrumental and primordial grievances of the population, thus giving an ethnic aspect to 
the confrontation. As an important intervening variable for the conflict escalation into a 
military confrontation is Russian interest in maintaining politico-economic and military 
domination over the region. Over time, all ethnic causes had been eliminated, thus 
creating the necessary conditions for the final political settlement of the conflict. 
However, the status quo, created around this conflict, suits the politico-economic interests 
of the Transdniestrian elites, and reinforced by the Russian interest in keeping the region 
under its influence, is encouraging them to promote a radical position toward the process 
of negotiations and to demand anything but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted 
by the legal Moldovan Government. In such circumstances, the final solution depends on 
the attitudes of the external players. However, the international players are dispersed over 
the methods of resolving this conflict, thus reinforcing the deadlock situation in the 
process of negotiation. This thesis argues that under the current circumstances, none of 
the conflict regulating mechanism, partition, confederation and federation will solve that 
particular conflict. However, the federalism has the most potential to serve as a tool for 
unification and conflict-resolution, but only if the international community and internal 
players will promote democratic values, rule of law and free marked orientation in the 
region; will reduce the benefits of the status quo situation and, finally, will offer 
substantial politico-economic and cultural autonomy combined with fair representation at 
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In 1990, American President George Herbert Bush declared in classical Wilsonian 
terms that 
a new world order… can emerge: a new era- freer from the threat of terror, 
stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. A 
world, were the rule of the law supplants the rule of the jungle. …A world 
where the strong respects the rights of the weak.1  
At the time, considerable evidence existed, suggesting that President’s Bush 
predictions had been correct: the end of the Cold War started a new era of international 
relations and was promising the development of a more secure environment. The new 
relations between the West and the East opened a new spectrum of cooperation and added 
more hope for the implementation of the collective security agreements. Some assumed 
that the victory of liberal beliefs would progress into “the end of history.”2  
As a result of the collapse of communism, many new independent states have 
been created. Most of them embraced democratic values of the West. However, the world 
did not become “more secure in the quest for peace” and history did not end. In addition 
to the spread of democratic values, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
block also brought a rise of nationalism, especially in the post–Communist countries. 
These nationalistic movements often gave rise to ethnic and internal disputes, thus, 
changing the character of violence and conflicts from mainly interstate to intrastate. For 
example, in 1998, only two of the major armed conflicts conducted around the world had 
been interstate in character.3  
The conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova is one of 
the conflicts that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which has 
                                                 
1 President George Herbert Walker Bush, “Toward a New World Order”  A transcript of former 
President George Herbert Walker Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and the nation on 
September 11, 1990,” available at  http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr.htm, last accessed 
03/20/04. 
2 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest 16, (Summer 1989), 3-18. 
3 Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking and State Failure,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Olster Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict, (U.S. Institute for Peace Press, Washington, 2001) 127.  
2 
transformed over time and is still ongoing after more than a decade of negotiations. This 
thesis analyses the evolution of the Transdniestrian conflict in the last decade. The author 
argues that the conflict in the Transdniestrian region in the Republic of Moldova in the 
beginning possessed all the characteristics of an ethnic conflict, but was actually caused 
by the elites struggle over the future economic control of the new formed country, 
reinforced by the immediate cause, which is Russian inspiration to maintain political, 
economic and military dominance over the regions. By 1994, all the ethnic causes of this 
conflict had been eliminated. However, the status quo situation, created around this 
conflict, after the introduction of the peacekeeping forces in July 1992, benefits the 
Transdniestrian elites, thus encouraging them to take a radical position toward the 
process of negotiations and to demand anything but independence, a fact that cannot be 
accepted by the legal Moldovan Government. This situation is reinforced by the 
disagreement of international mediators and players involved in the conflict concerning 
the methods of conflict-resolution. Furthermore, given the current politico-economic and 
social situation in the region as well as taking into consideration the positions of the 
players in the process of negotiation, this thesis analyses the capability of three conflict-
regulating methods to solve the Transdniestrian dispute: secession, confederalism and 
federalism. The author argues that in the current situation, none of these mechanisms will 
solve the conflict in the long run without undermining Moldova’s sovereignty and its 
democratic course of development and having a chance to escalate the conflict but not 
solve it. However, federal arrangements, and if necessary, conditions would be created 
that might be the best possible solution.  
Secession, the goal of the Tiraspol administration, might be a solution that will 
facilitate Moldova’s orientation toward the West and further democratization. However, 
as numerous authors indicate, secession often creates as many problems as resolving 
them and is firmly opposed by the international community. The author argues that the 
partition of Moldova would not resolve the conflict, but might escalate ethnic grievances 
between the nationalities within both region’s parts, that the conflict might change its 
character from intrastate to interstate, and that it will have encouraging an effect on other 
secessionist movements, thus escalating the conflict.  In addition, the author argues that 
the confederal solution is only a pretext for the Transdniestrian administration to become 
3 
recognized by the international community, and after that, to compromise the contract 
and secede, which will bring the same consequences as previously discussed. The third 
option, federalism, is currently promoted by the international community and argued by 
both parties in the conflict and seems to be the optimal solution to this problem. The 
author argues that in the current situation, the federalization of Moldova will not diminish 
the conflict, but will create a situation of political stagnation, democratic drawback, and 
further dependency from Russia, factors that might provoke further escalation of the 
conflict. Thus, internal actors as well as the international community first have to direct 
their efforts toward the creation of the necessary conditions for federal agreements to last, 
and after that, only to pursue a policy of federalism. Otherwise, Moldovan federalism is 
doomed to failure from the very beginning. 
 
 
Figure 1.   The Republic of Moldova4                                                  
4 CIA – The World Fact book, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html, last accessed 05/03/2004. 
4 
A. THE NOTION OF CONFLICT AND ITS REGULATING MECHANISMS    
The literature that focuses solely on the nature of ethnic identity cannot explain 
when and why identities become conflictual. Therefore, it is necessary to look to other 
theories to explain when and why identities will come into conflict. Thus, in order to 
explain ethnic and internal conflicts of the last decade, the actors and analysts turned to 
the primordial argument of “ancient hatreds” between hostile cultures.5  Primordialists 
believe that ethnic identities have deep historical roots and almost never change over 
time. For example, John Stack affirms: 
For primordialists, a sense of peoplehood forms the essence of ethnic 
identity. Ethnicity becomes an expression of basic group identity, basic in 
that fundamental group attributes are passed down from one generation to 
the next.6  
Thus, in the primordialists’ view, the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic claims 
in the late 20th century is mainly because of the primal human need to belong. Horowitz 
defines ethnic conflict as “a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and 
simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.”7 ”Without feelings of 
antipathy,” Horowitz emphasizes, “there can be no ethnic conflict.”8  United States 
President George Bush, for example, believed that war in Bosnia was a result of “age-old 
animosities,” while in 1993, President Clinton mentioned that “a generation raised in the 
shadow of the cold war assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine 
of freedom but threaten still by ancient hatreds.”9  
                                                 
5 For more info about primordial explanation of the ethnic conflicts see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985), Walker, Connor, “Terminological 
Chaos: A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group…,” in Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 91-115; Clifford, Geertz, “The   
Integrative Revolution” in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. 
Clifford Geertz, (New York: The Free Press, 1963) pp. 106– 157.  
6 John F. Stack, Jr., “Ethnic Mobilization in World Politics: The Primordial Perspective,” in The 
Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Modern World, ed. John F. Stack, Jr., (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1986), 1-11. 
7 Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985), 95. 
8 Donald L. Horowitz, Ibid.,182. 
9 George Bush, quoted in Jack Snyder, “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post Soviet State,” in Ethnic 
Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1993), 79-101 at 79; Bill Clinton, “Bill Clinton’s inauguration speech” available at 
http://www.bluemud.org/article/472, last accessed 04/02/04.  
5 
Fortunately, most of the events of the last decade are proving that the argument of 
ancient cultural hatreds is wrong. Instead, many scholars argue that ethnic conflicts are 
not the result of ancient hatreds, but are due to the conscious actions of the elites and 
groups to mobilize ethnic values in order to obtain access to political, economic and 
social resources.10  Summarizing the instrumental explanation of ethnicity, Paul Brass 
affirms:  
Ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites in 
modernizing and in postindustrial societies undergoing dramatic social 
change. This process invariably involves competition and conflict for 
political power, economic benefits and social status between competing 
elite, class, and leadership groups both within and among different ethnic 
categories.11   
Indeed, instrumentalists believe that political elites are the most important driving 
force in shaping ethnic identities with the goal of benefiting their political and economic 
self-interest. Thus, in order to achieve their goal, political elites can turn to ethnical 
questions and trigger ethnic conflicts. 
Neither primordialists, nor instrumentalists can fully explain all spectrums of 
internal and ethnic conflicts of the post Cold War period. They cannot explain why, in 
almost similar situations, violent conflicts erupted in some places but not in others. James 
Rule states: “We know a lot of things that are true about civil violence, but we do not 
know when they are going to be true.”12 Thus, besides these two main approaches, both 
of which stress factors internal to the groups concerned, there must be additional factors 
that are stimulating the violent outbreak of the ethnic or internal conflict.  
 
                                                 
10 In opposition to the primordial school of thoughts is instrumental and constructivist approach. For 
more info see Abner, Cohen, “Ethnicity and Politics,” excerpt from Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969) 198-201; Paul, Brass, “Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity 
Formation,” in Ethnicity and Nationalism, (London: Sage Publications, 1991) 18-26; Nathan, Glazer, and 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan. “Introduction,” in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995) 3-26; Benedict, Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism.( New York: Verso, 1983) 1-36; James, Fearon, and David Laitin, “Violence and the 
Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (4) (Autumn 2000), 845-877; 
11 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park, California: Sage 
Publication, 1991), 25. 
12 James B. Rule, Theories of Civil Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 265 
6 
Scholars of ethnic and internal conflicts have identified four main sets of factors 
that can facilitate the spark of violence more in some regions than others: structural 
factors, political factors, economic/social factors, and cultural perceptual factors. (See 
Table 1). 13  
However, some scholars affirm that the presence of only one of these factors 
cannot create the necessary conditions for the spark of an ethnic war. They argue that an 
ethnic war might occur only if all of the factors are present. For example, Stuart J. 
Kaufman mentions that in order to have a civil war, there should be hostile masses, 
belligerent leaders and inter-ethnic security dilemmas. Furthermore, these factors should 
be reinforced by the presence of the necessary preconditions or proximate causes of 
ethnically defined grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes over emotional 
symbols, mutual fears of extinction, and a de facto situation of anarchy. In addition, there 
should be political space and freedom for the political elites to engage in the process of 
“outbidding” as well as military means to enable both sides to fight.14  
 





Intrastate security concerns  
Ethnic geography 
Economic /Social Factors 
Economic problems 
Discriminatory economic systems 
Economic development and modernization 
Political Factors 
Discriminatory political institutions 




Patterns of cultural discrimination 
Problematic group histories 
 
                                                 
13 For detailed review of the literature on those factors see Michael E. Brown, op. cit., 214-218. 
14 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Interethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil 
War,”  
15 Michael E. Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications,” in Chester A. Crocker, 
Fen Olster Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict, (U.S. Institute for Peace Press, Washington, 2001), 214. 
7 
In many situations, some of these proximate causes might be a cause for 
escalating another cause. Thus, no ethnic and internal conflicts develop following the 
same path.16 Therefore, as ethnic and internal conflicts might be caused by multiple 
factors and they follow different development paths, there cannot be only one recipe for 
the process of conflict-resolution. In describing the conflict-resolution processes, scholars 
and analysts are mostly divided into two groups: partition theorists and theorists that 
promote the idea of resolving the conflicts through the methods of inclusion, not 
exclusion.   
Some proponents of the partition theory argue that the separation of conflicting 
ethnicities might be the only possible long-term solution to civil wars. They acknowledge 
that an ethnic war cannot end without territorial partition and possible movements of the 
population.17 As Donald L. Horowitz mentions,  
If the short run is so problematical, if the constraints on policy innovation 
are many, if even grand statements need patchwork readjustment, perhaps 
it is a mistake to seek accommodation among the antagonists. If it is 
impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it 
is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state, even 
if this necessitates population transfers. Separating the antagonists—
partition—is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where 
groups are territorially concentrated.18 
However, in current international affairs, partition is accepted by the international 
community only in a very few cases.  
 
                                                 
16 See Michael E. Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications,” Stuart J. 
Kaufman, “Spiraling to Interethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” 
International Security 21 (2) (Autumn 1996), 108-138. 
17 For more info see Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 
International Security 20 (Spring 1996); idem, “When All Else Fails,” International Security 23 (Fall 
1998); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, “When Peace Means War,” New Republic (December 
1995).  Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 
588; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 44–47; 
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 121; 
and Samuel P. Huntington, “Civil Violence and the Process of Development,” Adelphi Paper no. 83 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).  
18 Donald L., Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 
588. 
8 
Other scholars have counter-argued for the strategy of inclusion rather than 
exclusion. They see major possibilities in resolving ethnic and civil conflicts by 
promoting liberal values and democratic principles of government. These authors stress 
that partition does not solve the conflict. It only creates the premises for interstate conflict 
instead of intrastate, creates undemocratic successor states, and generates tremendous 
human suffering. In the era of democratic development, more and more attention has 
been focused on power sharing and dividing territories, while maintaining overall 
national integrity. As the American political scientist Samuel Huntington mentioned 
“…the twentieth century bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is just about as 
strong as the nineteenth century bias against marital divorce.”19  Nicolas Sambanis, using 
multiple sets of data, conducted a study aimed at verifying the possible impact of 
partition on war’s recurrence, low-grade ethnic violence, and on political institutions of 
the new states.  According to his data, almost all the arguments of the partition theory fail 
the test. The most significant finding of Sambanis is that, on average, partition does not 
significantly reduce the probability of a new spark of violence. 20  
In contrast, autonomy and federalism are viewed as some of the major tools of 
resolving ethnic and internal conflicts. Among the methods of dividing territories, 
federalism is the most applicable because of its “conflict-regulating effects.” In fact, 
many scholars including Smith, Duchacek, Riker, Lijphart, Przeworski, and Sisk support 
the idea that federalism, as a method of ethno-territorial conflict settlement, indeed is the 
best method for achieving long-term successful results. In federal arrangements, the 
central government has specific areas of authority, the units have some degree of 
autonomy and both levels of government have limited coordinated powers. 
As Horowitz mentions, federalism has four major positive functions. First, 
combined with the electoral system, it can encourage party proliferation, which also 
might facilitate coalition building. Second, the politics at the local level can serve as a 
training ground for politics at the higher level. Third, federalism disperses conflict at the 
                                                 
19 Samuel P., Huntington, “Foreword,” in Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies, 1972;  Eric 
Nordlinger. Occasional Papers in International Affaires No. 29, Harvard University, sited in Timothy D., 
Sisk, Power sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic conflicts, (USIP Press, Washington, 1996), P.1.  
20 Nicholas, Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4. (Jul., 
2000), pp. 437-483. 
9 
center by resolving some of the issues at the regional level. Fourth, it creates difficulties 
for parties to achieve hegemony at the central level, and it would be difficult for any to 
challenge all constituent regions. Thus, devolving power enhances autonomy within one 
national unit; multiplies the number of power positions and thus lessens the stakes of 
controlling power at the center, which in turn, lessens the zero-sum nature of unitary 
systems. The most important fact is that in federal arrangements, neither the center nor 
the regions can amend the arrangement without mutual consent.21 This fact creates 
possibilities for peaceful management of the ethnic disputes in the short, as well as, in the 
long run.   
However, federalism is not an “innocent child.” It also has many pitfalls that can 
create problems, but not solve them. Federalism creates duplication of functions, 
increases expenses on building state capitals, and might create conditions for civil 
servants to serve only in their home regions.22 For the country that has poor economic 
development, these conditions are significant. In addition, the decision–making process 
in the federal states is slower and more complicated. Furthermore, if the politico-
ideological commitment of the population and elites is not directed toward living 
together, but is inspired by other goals, or outside parties impose the federal solution, this 
federation will not last long, and in the end, might result in the escalation of conflict. 
Thus, for federal arrangements to work, commitment and patience are strictly necessary 
conditions.  
Finally, as Horowitz mentions, “even in the most severely divided society, ties of 
blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood,” even though “events of the past decades 
have by now impressed upon even the more casual observers of world politics that ethno- 
nationalism constitutes a major and growing threat to the political stability of most 
states.”23 Scholars in many ways explain the origins of these threats and their possible 
solutions. Yet, no prescribed set of rules exist that can be applied to all conflicts.  
                                                 
21 Wheare, Sir Kenneth. Modern Constitutions. (Oxford University Press, 1964), xviii. 
22 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 622. 
23 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 684; 
and Walker. Connor, “Terminological Chaos: A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group…,” in 
Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 91. 
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However, as Timothy Sisk mentions, “successful conflict-regulating practices involve 
establishing a stable set of formal and informal rules and institutions that encourage 
political leaders and groups in conflict to behave moderately toward one another.”24  
In summary, ethnic identities are instrumental and are shaped by the political 
elites with the goal of benefiting their political and economic self-interest. Thus, in order 
to achieve their goal, political elites can turn to ethnic questions and trigger ethnic 
conflicts. However, ethnic and internal conflicts might be caused by multiple factors and 
they follow different development paths. Thus, there cannot be only one recipe for the 
process of conflict-resolution. In describing conflict-resolution processes, scholars and 
analysts are mostly divided into two groups: partition theorists and theorists that promote 
the idea of resolving the conflicts through the methods of inclusion, not exclusion. Thus, 
all the above-mentioned conflict-regulating mechanisms have their pros and cons. 
However, it seems that federalism is the most reliable mechanism, which  can create the 
necessary conditions for interethnic cooperation, but not division. Secession does not 
guarantee that the conflict would not erupt again in the new formed state. Accordingly, 
the confederal solution is based on a contract between two parts, which can be easily 
reversed and serve the purpose of legalizing the secessionist movement. In that context, 
federalism, despite its imperfection, by promoting unity in division, might facilitate 
intergroup cooperation as well as maintain autonomy of each group. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
What would be the best long term political solution for the conflict in the 
Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova? To respond to this question, an 
analysis must include a combination of causes that provoked the conflict, the current 
status and interests of the parties involved in conflict regulation, and conflict regulating 
tools that are available from international practice. The author argues that the leading 
cause of the conflict is the competition among post-Soviet politicians fighting over the 
division of the Soviet state and redistribution of political and economic benefits. 
However, in their fight for power, the elites mobilized instrumental and primordial 
grievances of the population, thus giving an ethnic aspect to the confrontation. 
                                                 
24 Timothy Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, (U.S. Institute of 
Peace, Washington, D.C. 1996), 48. 
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Threatened by the nationalistic movements in Moldova and supported by the Russian 
nationalists and militaries, Transdniestrian elites manipulated the populations in the 
region toward continuous affiliation with the Soviet Union and resistance to the new 
changes, introduced by the new emerging elites. The new emerging indigenous elites at 
the same time have seen the opportunity to escape from the control of the center and 
direct manage the country in the different way and have seen the demands of the 
Transdniestrian traditional authorities for further affiliation with the Soviet Union as an 
attempt to maintain the old regime and old ruling elites. That fact created a security 
dilemma, which in the end, escalated to the point of a military confrontation. An 
important intervening variable for the escalation of conflict into a military confrontation 
is Russian interest in maintaining political, economic and military domination over the 
region. Their direct political, economic and military support of the Tiraspol 
administration encouraged the secessionist elites to take aggressive actions against the 
legal Moldovan government and to establish authoritarian control over the 
Transdniestrian region. 
In addition, this thesis argues that over time all ethnic causes had been eliminated, 
thus creating the necessary conditions for a final political settlement of conflict. As 
Barbara F. Walter mentions, 
Resolving a civil war is never simply a matter of reaching a bargain and 
then instituting a ceasefire. To be successful, a civil war peace settlement 
must consolidate the previously warring factions into a single state, build a 
new government capable of accommodating their interests, and create a 
new national nonpartisan military force.25  
However, in the case of the Moldovan conflict, the status quo created around this 
conflict permitted the establishment of two de facto independent states: the Republic of 
Moldova and the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic. This status quo situation perfectly 
suits the economic and political interests of the Transdniestrian elites, thus encouraging 
them to promote a radical position toward the process of negotiations and to demand 
anything but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the legal Moldovan 
Government. Russian interests in Moldova did not decrease and, speaking in realists’ 
                                                 
25 Barbara F. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 
Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, (NY, Columbia University Press, 1999) 38-69, 43. 
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terms, with the extension of NATO to include Romania in April 2004, the importance of 
military, political and economic influence over that region became a strategic goal of the 
Russian Federation (RF), whose position is strictly opposed by Western powers and 
international organizations. Thus, a solution to this conflict, which would accommodate 
the major demand of all parties, is impossible in the current situation.     
This thesis also analyzes the possibility of three major conflict regulating tools, 
secession, federalism and confederalism, to extinguish the Transdniestrian conflict, and 
as a result, to increase security in the region. Currently, the unrecognized Transdniestrian 
government promotes the option of confederation or total secession, while the 
international community as well as the government of the Republic of Moldova is opting 
for a federal solution. However, this thesis argues that none of these mechanisms in 
current situation would facilitate conflict resolution at the same time maintaining 
Moldova’s sovereignty and democratic course of development. The author argues that 
recognition and the secession of Transdniestria would not resolve the conflict in the 
region. One set of facts supporting this argument is the demographics of Transdniestria. 
A confederal solution might have the same outcome as secession in the end. 
A federal solution might facilitate the final settlement of the Transdniestrian 
conflict. Federalism is the form of government most extensively accepted as a conflict-
regulating tool. However, taking into consideration the deferent ideological development 
of the region, the economical interests of the Transdniestrian elites, the authoritarian 
inclination of both the Moldovan and Transdniestrian governments, and the geo-strategic 
interests of the Russian federation, under current conditions, a federal system of 
government would not be effective and would create the necessary conditions for a 
conflict between pro-Western democratic forces and left-wing totalitarian forces. Thus, 
instead of providing a solution to the conflict, it escalates it. However, in the future, this 
model might be the solution if the necessary conditions would be created. Thus, in order 
to eliminate the obstacles for final integration, the international community and internal 
actors have to promote democratic values in the region, the rule of law and free marked 
orientation reduce the benefits of the status quo situation and, finally offer  substantial 
politico-economic and cultural autonomy combined with fair representation at the central  
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level to the Transdniestrian region. When aforementioned conditions are in place, the 
implementation of a federal solution will have a chance to act as a mechanism of 
unification and conflict-regulation, but not as a tool of division and conflict escalation.  
Sources for this thesis include interviews with government officials and leaders of 
the major political parties from Moldova, members of the international and non-
governmental organizations, academics and journalists conducted in Chisinau, the capital 
of the Republic of Moldova in January 2004; publications and documents related to 
current and historical development of the Republic of Moldova; and the scholarly 
literature on ethnicity, ethnic and internal conflicts and conflict resolution.   
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II discuses the historical background of the Republic of Moldova and the 
causes of the Transdniestrian conflict, applying an instrumental approach to the 
development of the conflict. The chapter mainly focuses on the causes that facilitated the 
spark of the conflict.  
This chapter will conclude that the Transdniestrian conflict has many 
characteristics of an ethnic conflict. However, the main cause is the struggle between the 
elites, reinforced by Russian interest in dominating the region, a fact that suggests that 
Moscow carefully planned and managed this conflict.  
Chapter III analyses the process of post conflict resolution, stressing the positions 
and development of internal actors after the achievement of the cease-fire agreement: the 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) and the Republic of Moldova (RM). In order 
to demonstrate the thesis argument, the first part of the chapter discusses the cease-fire 
agreement between the Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation as well as the role 
of the peace-keeping forces in the post conflict period. The second part evaluates the path 
of development of Moldovan and Transdniestrian statehood. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that in the current situation, the political solution to this conflict cannot be 
achieved only through the efforts of the internal players, thus, international involvement 
in that process in critical.   
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Chapter IV analyses the interests and positions of the United States, Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and Romania, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, as well as the European Union. It argues that the permanent 
deadlock in the process of the negotiations of the Transdniestrian conflict is not only the 
result of disagreements between the internal actors, but is also caused by the attitudes and 
interests of the external players. This chapter concludes that the current state of affairs  
between the external players does not contribute to the amelioration of the conflict-
regulating climate, but diminishes even more conflict regulating functions of the 
available options.    
In this context, Chapter V analyzes the possibility of the three main conflict-
regulating mechanisms, secession, federalism and confederalism, to provide a long term 
solution to the Transdniestrian conflict.  This chapter concludes that under current 
conditions, none of the aforementioned conflict-regulating mechanisms will facilitate the 
final settlement of the dispute. However, in the future, federalism might be the solution, if 
the necessary conditions could be created. Thus, in order to create a favorable 
environment for a federal agreement, which will unite, but not devolve, the international 
community and internal actors must promote democratic values in the region, the rule of 
law and free marked orientation, reduce the benefits of the status quo situation and, 
finally offer the Transdniestrian region substantial politico-economic and cultural 
autonomy combined with fair representation at the central level. With the aforementioned 
conditions in place, federalization of the Republic of Moldova will have chance to act as 
a mechanism of unification and conflict-regulation, but not as a tool of division and 
conflict escalation.  
The concluding chapter summarizes the causes of the Transdniestrian conflict, its 
evolution and why none of the conflict regulating mechanisms of partition, confederalism 
and federalism would not be efficient in establishing a long term political solution to the 
conflict, under current conditions but would escalate it.  
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II. FROM MOLDAVIA TO MOLDOVA: ORIGINS AND NATURE 
OF THE TRANSDNIESTRIAN CONFLICT 
Ethnic consciousness is realized when groups feel either threatened with a 
loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely feel that is an 
opportune moment to overcome long-lasting denial of privilege… 
Furthermore, ethnic consciousness, being a political phenomenon, is a 
form of conflict. The conflict needs not be violent to be sure, though of 
course it often is.26 
Immanuel Wallerstein 
 
The conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova is often 
described as those in Abkhazia, South Osetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Empirical wisdom 
concerning these conflicts states they were created by the reemergence of the nationalistic 
movements, released by the collapse of totalitarian Soviet rule. However, the nature of 
the Transdniestrian conflict is more complex and difficult to explain. 
Opinions about the causes of the Transdniestrian conflict differ. The 
Transdniestrian dispute is often presented as a confrontation of the Russian speaking 
population against the discriminatory policies of the Moldovan government.27 The ethnic 
aspect of this conflict is mainly implied because of the confrontation between Russian 
speaking populations from the East bank of the Dniester River with the Moldovan 
population from the other bank. However, it has to be mentioned that 70 percent of the 
Russian speaking population lives on the West bank of the Dniester River and peacefully 
coexists with the Moldovan majority. Officials from both Moldova and Transdniestria, 
and most scholars affirm that the root of the conflict was not primarily ethnic.28 For 
example, Former Moldovan President Mircea Snegur maintains that the conflict was not  
                                                 
26 Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Two Modes of Ethnic Consciousness: Soviet Central Asia in 
Transition,” The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Praeger, 
1973), 168-69.  
27 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Interethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil 
War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Autumn, 1996), 108-138;  
28 Most of the interviewed elites from Moldova expressed that view. Interviews conducted personally 
in Chisinau, capital city of the RM, 12 -17 January 2004.  
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an ethnic conflict, but was triggered by the “rebel elites” of the Transdniestrian region, 
supported by the Russian Federation.29 Igor Smirnov, the president of the Transdniestrian 
unrecognized administration mentions that the conflict was a Moldovan aggression.30  
This chapter argues that the competition among traditional and new emerged neo-
traditional Moldovan elites is at the center of this conflict , who are fighting over the 
distribution of power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as Russian interest 
in preserving Moldova under its political, economic and military influence. However, in 
their struggle, the elites mobilized and manipulated instrumental and primordial 
grievances of the population, thus giving an ethnic aspect to the confrontation. 
Accordingly, in order to demonstrate the origins and nature of the Transdniestrian 
conflict, the first part of the chapter will analyze the historical development of Bessarabia 
since its first annexation by Russia in 1812 and up to 1992, when the military conflict 
erupted, and the role of the Transdniestrian Region in the process of Moldovan state 
building during Soviet times. This section will argue that after WWII, the Bessarabian 
population and its elites developed an affiliation with the Moldovan identity while the 
majority of the population and the elites from the Transdniestrian region identified 
themselves more with the Soviet identity. The elites in their struggle for control of the 
region used this factor after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second part of the 
chapter analyses four underling factors of the conflict: structural, political, economic and 
cultural factors and their role in triggering the conflict, and argues that the conflict did 
have some ethnic aspects. However, it was mainly caused by the elites struggle over the 
future economic control of the newly formed country, reinforced by the proximate cause, 
which is Russian inspiration to maintain political, economic and military dominance over 
the region.  
A.  THE FATE OF MOLDOVA: CHARACTERISTICS OF MOLDOVAN 
IDENTITY 
Over the last two centuries, Turks, Russians, Soviets and Romanians had 
permanent divergences over the control of the region between the Dnester and Prut 
Rivers, which was called Bessarabia. That argument between the bigger powers                                                  
29 Author’s interview with former Moldova President Mircea Snegur, in January 2004, Chisinau. 
30 Igor Smirnov, cited in Valeriu Mija, “A Solution to Moldova’s Transdniestrian Conflict: Regional 
Complex Interdependence,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2003, 14. 
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significantly influenced the demographics and development of the identity of the people 
of current Moldova. The population of Bessarabia, due to historical developments, was 
always dispersed and did not have a sense of unity of identity.  However, the greatest 
impact, which in the end was manipulated by the elites, was the creation of two different 
identities in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic during Soviet times. The 
Transdniestrian population was more inclined toward Soviet internationalism, while the 
rest of Moldova identified itself with the Republic of Moldova, not the Soviet Union or 
Romania, a factor very well manipulated by the elites in order to secure their political and 
economic positions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
1. From Principality to Province: Russian Rule in Bessarabia (1812-
1918) 
As a result of Russian rule over the Bessarabian territories in the 19th century, this 
region did not participate in the process of Romanian state and nation building, which 
came into being after the unification of Moldova, part of which was historically and 
culturally Bessarabia and Walachia, but were transformed into a periphery of the Russian 
empire and left underdeveloped. As a result, by the beginning of the 20th century, the 
titular population of Bessarabia was still viewing itself as Moldovan, while most of the 
minorities and inhabitants in the cities developed strong inclinations toward Russia and 
Russian culture.  
Russia formally annexed the eastern reaches of the Moldovan Principality, the 
Bessarabia, region between the Prut and Dnester Rivers under the treaty of Bucharest, 
which was signed in 1812 between Tsar Alexander I and Sultan Mahmud II. The 
Russians viewed this annexation as liberating the Bessarabian Christians from Ottoman 
repression, and at the same time, as a reconquest of the historical Slav lands, but not the 
liberation of the Moldovan nation.31 For a short period after its annexation to Russia in 
1812, Bessarabia had some autonomy in governance and the Moldovan language was 
                                                 
31 Most historians believe the annexation was unlawful. The Romanian principalities of Walachia and 
Moldova were two sovereign states t under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, to whom they paid 
tribute in exchange for protection. Thus, the Turks had no right to give Bessarabia away, since it was not its 
territory. For more information see Nicholas Dima, Bessarabia and Bucovina: The Soviet-Romanian 
Territorial Dispute, (East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia University Press, NY, 1982), 14; 
Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2000), 19. N. V. Lashcov, Stoletie prissoedinenia Bessarabii k Rosii, 1812-1912 (Chisinau: 
Tipografia Bessarabskago Gubernscago Pravleniia, 1912), cited in Charles King, op. cit., 27. 
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used together with Russian as official languages for local administration. However, after 
1828, Bessarabia lost its autonomy, and in 1854, official bilingualism was abolished. The 
Russian language became the only official language of the region and the Bessarabian 
church was subordinated to the Moscow patriarchy. In 1871, the Russian Empire changed 
Bessarabian status from an imperial region to a Russian province in order to make it a 
part of the Russian heartland itself.  Thus, in that period, the political and cultural life of 
the Bessarabian Region was oriented toward Russification and integration into Russian 
imperial structures.  
Bessarabia became the periphery of the Russian empire, and consequently was a 
place out of the reach of Russian officials. Thus, this region was left underdeveloped 
economically, culturally, and educationally. Counter-tsarist elements were also deported 
there.32 The land remained undeveloped and Bessarabia had the highest mortality rate in 
Europe, which was 50 percent higher than the Russian average. In addition, it was 
famous for having the most corrupt governors in the Russian empire. Taking in 
consideration all these factors, the Russian management of Bessarabia was a disaster and 
did not facilitate the development of a common identity in the region.33 
The demographic and cultural development of Bessarabia was also controversial. 
By the end of the 19th century, Bessarabian Romanians formed approximately 47.6 
percent of the total Bessarabian population. However, most were rural and illiterate.34 
The population in the rural part of the country spoke Moldovan while Russian policies 
ensured that the Bessarabian towns would use Russian.  As Irina Livezeanu mentions, 
“Pre-1918 Chisinau was a Russian cultural island between a sea of Moldovan 
peasants.”35 The demography of Chisinau and other towns also illustrates the impact of 
Russian domination over the region. By 1918, Jews and Russians dominated most of the 
Bessarabian towns. Over 50,000 Jews were living in Chisinau in 1897, what constituted 
                                                 
32 The famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin was one of the people sent to Bessarabia as a 
reprimand for his activities.  
33 Nicholas Dima, op. cit., 16.  
34 In the 19th century in Bessarabia, 84.4 percent of the rural population and 67.2 of the urban 
population was illiterate, which made the region a perfect place for the exile of the Russian revolutionists. 
For more information, see Irina Livezeanu, “Urbanization in a Low Key and Linguistic Problems in Soviet 
Moldavia. Part 1”, Soviet Studies, Vol. 33, no. 3, 330. 
35 Irina Livezeanu, op. cit., 330.  
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nearly half the total population. In addition, Russian imperial policies created a Russian-
speaking elite to govern its frontier province and directed the efforts to maintain their 
orientation toward Russia rather than Romania, while leaving the rural population 
underdeveloped,36 demonstrating that Russian policies were not interested in the 
development of the titular Bessarabian population and were promoting the policies of 
Russian affiliation of those people. This also contributed to the development of many 
identities in that region.. 
The Principalities of Walachia and Moldova, which historically included also 
Bessarabia, in the second part of the 19th century created the United Principalities. These 
Principalities later become Romanian Kingdom. In the process of state building, 
Wallachians and Moldovans were assimilated into a common Romanian identity and 
their language became the Romanian language based on the lateen alphabet, in contrast 
with Cyrillic, used before in Moldova, and was still used by the Bessarabian Romanians. 
Political elites in the new principalities started a campaign for integration of all 
Romanian-speaking territories, including Bessarabia, into one nation-state. After 
Romania’s independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and its transformation into a 
kingdom in 1881, the dispute over the origins and destiny of all Bessarabia became even 
more intensive. However, because of the Russian annexation of Bessarabia, Moldovans 
(Bessarabian Romanians) from that region could not participate in the development of a 
Romanian state and Romanian identity, but had a fraternal attitude toward them.37  
In summary, by the beginning of the 20th century, despite long Russian 
domination over the region, the Bessarabian population did not have a sense of unity.  
The titular nationality of the region, predominantly rural, maintained their historic 
affiliation with the Moldovan Principality, which over time, in the rest of the Moldovan 
Principality, evolved into a Romanian one. At the same time, the titular population of 
Bessarabia was living in isolation from Russian culture. General A. N. Kuropatkin, 
former Russian Minister of War, in 1910 concluded, “Romanian population of Bessarabia 
still lived in isolation and aloof from Russians and in the future, be it by peaceful means 
                                                 
36 Charles King, op. cit., 50. 
37 Charles King, op. cit., 23. 
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or following another war, the unification of the Romanian people would be inevitable.”38 
In contrast, all other minorities were more directed toward Russian culture and language. 
Thus, after the collapse of the Russian empire, and Bessarabian integration in Romania, 
these factors played a significant role in the process of the creation of Romanian identity 
in the region.  
2. The Bessarabians in Greater Romania 
In 1917, the Russian Bolshevik revolution created opportunities for Bessarabia to 
forsake Russia and finally unite with the “mother-land” Romania.  Taking into 
consideration the turmoil in Russia, the Romanian government firmly decided to retake 
territories unjustly annexed by the Russians in 1812 and 1878 as well as  assimilate the 
Bessarabian Moldovans into the Romanian nation. However, by WWII, the identity of 
the Bessarabian population did not evolve into a Romanian identity, despite Romanian 
policies of Romanization, but became even more dispersed.  
In late December 1917 and early January1918, the leaders of the Sfatul Tarii, the 
Moldovan Parliament at the time, asked the Romanian Government for military 
assistance.39 By January 26, Romanian troops were stationed in Chisinau. Following the 
events in Russia, Moldavian parliamentarians realized that Russia was taking a non-
democratic path of development, and therefore, proclaimed Moldavian independence on 
February 5, 1918. Some members of the Sfatul Tarii proposed unification with Romania. 
With the presence of Romanian troops in the capital city of Moldavia, it was 
much easier for the proponents of the unification with Romania to win. However, support 
for the union was mixed. On March 27, 1918, the Sfatul Ţării declared conditional union 
with the Romanian Kingdom. The main concern of the Bessarabian peasants and 
minorities at this point was the possibility that the Romanians would stop land reforms 
started by the Moldavian government. Therefore, a list with fourteen conditions was 
attached to the declaration of unification. Among them, two of the most important 
conditions were the continuation of land reforms under the authority of the Sfatul Ţării 
and provincial autonomy for Bessarabia after the unification. However, on November 27, 
1918, motivated by the Romanian heritage of Moldovans and the inspiration of being 
                                                 
38 Nicolas Dima, op. cit., 16. 
39 Wim P. van Meurs, op. cit., 62. 
21 
incorporated into the wider Romanian family, the deputies “renounced the previous 
conditions, declared union with Romania, and voted to dissolve the assembly, thus 
placing a definitive end to Bessarabia’s brief tenure as an independent republic.”40  
During the next two decades after unification, the Romanian government made 
many efforts to integrate the former Russian province into the new kingdom. As one 
cultural activist reported in the 1920’s, “That Bessarabia has remained culturally 
backward is our greatest advantage. …We are working in an environment in which we 
have to create everything but destroy very little.”41 Many social and construction projects 
were conducted in the region by the ministries and the army. In the 1930’s, new schools, 
roads, bridges, airports, telephone lines and radio stations were built in Bessarabia. As a 
result of these efforts, the region had significantly improved between WWI and WWII. 
However, compared with other regions of the Romanian kingdom, Bessarabia was still 
culturally and economically backward. Only 13 percent of the entire population lived in 
the cities, while the percentage of urban Moldovans was even smaller, approximately 
seven percent.  
As a result, the literacy rate in Bessarabia rose to nearly 30 percent, and by the 
end of 1930’s, less than one percent of Moldovans did not consider Romanian their 
native language.42 Thus, taking into consideration their percentage of the total Moldovan 
population, and the total percentage of the population leaving in urban areas, or 13 
percent, the conclusion reached is that the process of the creation of a Romanian identity 
in the Bessarabian territory was slowly returning positive results.  
However, the task of incorporating Bessarabia into Greater Romania proved to be 
more difficult than anticipated. Despite their Romanian origins, the Bessarabian 
population missed the most important moments of the development of the Romanian 
identity: the rebellion against the Ottomans in 1821, the standardization and latinization 
of the Romanian language and alphabet in the 1840’s and 1850’s, the creation of a 
unified Romanian state in 1859, and the achievement of independence from the Porte in 
                                                 
40 Charles King, op. cit., 35. 
41 Letter from Propagandist N. Stan to Minister of Education, April 26, 1920, ANR-DAIC, f. 
Ministerul Instructiunii, d 118/1920, f.53, cited in Charles King, op. cit., 46.  
42 Charles King, op. cit., 45. 
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1887. These facts created an attitude of superiority of Romanians over the Moldovan 
counterparts. In addition, the Romaniasation, which with the introduction of other norms 
and procedures including the reeducation of Moldovans from the accustomed Cyrillic 
alphabet to the Latin, created resistance from the older population in the Bessarabian 
villages and from the urban population. The attitude of the corrupt and irresponsible 
Romanian administrators and militaries reinforced this situation. In such conditions, not 
only did the minorities not longer feel sympathy toward the central government, but 
Moldovans also soon developed a sense that they had been occupied by Romanians and 
not united with them.43  
By the end of the 1930’s, Bessarabian elites had begun to have doubts about the 
righteousness of the unification and the “ability of Romanian state to reform itself – and 
the willingness of central authorities to respect the specific regional identity of 
Bessarabia,” and were inclined more toward the Russian language than the Romanian.44 
That sentiment was also increased by the dominance of the Russian press over Romanian 
publications. In the 1930’s Chisinau had only two weeklies in Romanian, but could boast 
five separate Russian-language dailies, which, however, was as much a result of 
linguistic preference as of the capital’s neglect.45  
Bessarabians and their elites were even less enthusiastic about Bolshevik 
collectivization and the appropriation of peasants’ property implemented on the left bank 
of the Dniester River. Therefore, annexation of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union in 1940 
was cheered by only small portion of the population, consisting mainly of non-
Moldovans. The small part of the indigenous elite created during Romanian governance 
took refugee in Romania or was purged by the Communist administration.46  
In June 1941, Romanian troops, together with fascist armies, invaded the Soviet 
Union. Romania reannexed Bessarabia and got control over the Transdniestrian region, a 
                                                 
43 My personal conclusion, formulated after the discussion with many elderly people in my home 
village of Holercani on the right side of the Dniester River in Moldova.   
44 Charles King, op. cit., 48. 
45 Charles King, op. cit., 47. 
46 Personal discussions with the old villagers in the village of Holercani, situated on the right bank of 
the Dniester River.  
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territory between the Dniester and Bug Rivers.47 Romania’s goal was to regain control 
over Bessarabia, but it had no interest in annexing the Transdniestrian Region. However, 
this region greatly suffered from the German and Romanian occupation.  During the 
occupation, over 120,000 Jews and Gypsies from Bessarabia and Bukovina, along with 
many others from Transdniestria, were deported or killed in that particular region, which 
was the greatest liquidation of Jews by non-German forces.48 Statistical data shows that 
in 1930, the Jews constituted 7.2 percent of the Bessarabian population, while in 1959, 
their number dropped to 3.3 percent of the Moldavian population.49 A sentiment of 
antipathy toward Romanians by the Transdniestrian population resulted. The traditional 
Russophon elites to mobilize support for violent actions during the Transdniestrian 
conflict would successfully use this sentiment. In August 1944, Soviet troops once again 
gained control over the Bessarabian territory and definitely secured its place in the Soviet 
Moldavia as a component part of the Soviet Union. 
In summary, the 26-year period of Bessarabian development under Romanian 
sovereignty contributed to further deviation of the identity of the Bessarabian population. 
Despite the significant results achieved by the policy of Romanization, the lower status of 
Bessarabia in the kingdom and the irresponsible attitude of the Romanian administration 
in promoting reforms during the interwar period as well as the backwardness of the 
Bessarabian peasants significantly slowed down the process. Thus, by the end of the 
WWII, the Bessarabian population did not develop a unified identity. Part of the 
population viewed themselves as Romanians, while another part remained “the sons and 
grandsons of Moldovans of 1812.” Significantly, by that time, Russian and Ukrainian 
minorities were more oriented toward Russia, thus creating an even broader spectrum for 
ethnic manipulations. The indigenous elites were few and most emigrated to Romania 
after the annexation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union. These facts significantly 
improved the chances of the Soviet Union to create a Soviet Moldovan Nation, and 
finally, unify the identity of the region.                                                  
47 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism: 1914-1945, (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 
1995), 396. 
48 For more information on the Holocaust in Transdniestria, see Ivan Butnaru, The Silent Holocaust: 
Romania and Its Jews, (New York, 1992) and Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of 
Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940-1944 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000). 
49 Irina, Livezeanu, op. cit. 
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3. Making of a Soviet Moldavian Nation 
Bessarabia’s unification with Romania was never recognized by the Soviet Union, 
becoming an issue in diplomatic relations not only between these two countries but also 
in European affairs. In order to gain access to Bessarabia, in 1924, the Soviet Union 
created the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) with a Ukrainian 
majority (50 percent) in the Transdniestrian region, as a component part of the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic and promoted the idea of an independent Moldavian nation. 50  
However, after WWII, the idea of a Moldovan nation was abolished and, as a result of 
Soviet economic and demographic policies, the identity of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MSSR) had split along the lines of dependency from and commitment to 
Soviet ideology.  
This section argues that the political elites from the MASSR resisted the process 
of the development of an independent Moldovan nation since the beginning, and after 
WWII, it was abandoned and the policy in MSSR was mainly oriented toward the 
sovietisation of the region. For that purpose, the elites in Moldova were mostly Russians 
and Ukrainians as well as an insignificant number of Moldovans from the Transdniestrian 
area of the Republic. Furthermore, industrialization of Transdniestria, accompanied by 
demographic changes, and an agricultural orientation of the rest of Moldavia, created an 
economic division in the perception of Moldavian identity, a fact the elites from both 
sides of the Dniester River finally manipulated.  
a. The Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and its 
Role in the Process of Formation of the Moldovan Nation 
The creation of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MASSR) reflected a new argument of the Soviet Union (SU) against Romanian 
integration of Bessarabia: the population of Bessarabia constituted a separate ethno-
national group from the Romanians with the right of self-determination.  Charles King 
mentions, “With the appearance of “a Moldovan nation” and the creation of its 
provisional homeland in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, the ethno- national  
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identity of the Moldovans themselves became the centerpiece of Soviet propaganda 
efforts.”51 However, the process of nation building was a failure and only further 
disunited the Moldovans. 
In order to give credibility to the argument of a distinct Moldavian nation 
from the Romanians, the Transdniestrian administrative and party elites concentrated 
their efforts in defining the precise identity of the Moldovans, and in formalizing their 
culture, especially the language.52  Therefore, in the 1920’s, the Communist party made 
an attempt at the Moldovanisation of the state and party apparatus in MASSR.53 
However, the same bureaucrats that created it resisted this policy. Thus, as late as 1936, 
most of the administration in MASSR were still non-Moldovans and were not 
knowledgeable about the Moldovan language.  
However, the language policy of the Communist rulers was not consistent. 
In the beginning, in order to make the gap between Romanians and Moldavians even 
wider, the newly created Moldovan language was based on the Cyrillic alphabet,54 whose 
goal was to represent the spoken language of the Moldovans from the Transdniestrian 
region and was one of the most radical attempts to create a distinctive Romanian 
Moldovan language. However, by 1932, the party policy changed and the attitudes 
toward the Moldovan language changed as well. The local party administration decided 
to change the language to the Latin alphabet. As Charles King argues, “the introduction 
of Latin alphabet in 1932 brought to a definitive end the effort to build a wholly separate 
Moldovan nation.”55 The primary intent of the policy was to make MASSR more 
attractive to the Bessarabian population and to create a positive basis for the future 
annexation of Bessarabia. The main component of the Moldovan language also had 
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shifted from the Transdniestrian dialect to the language spoken by the Moldovans in the 
Bessarabian area, which was the Romanian language. However, in May 1938, MASSR 
returned to the Cyrillic alphabet. This time the reason for changing the alphabet lay 
outside the MASSR itself. In that period, the Soviet government was implementing a 
policy of transferring all Latin-based alphabets of non-Russian populations to Cyrillic, a 
process that was completed by 1940. Thus, discontinuity in the language and cultural 
policies during the process of Soviet Moldovan Nation building negatively affected the 
process of the creation of a distinctive Moldovan identity in the MSSR. 
In addition, by 1940, the communist party had purged almost all engineers 
of Moldovan identity as promoters of nationalism. The Moldovan Scientific Committee 
was liquidated in 1933 as a “nest of bourgeois nationalists.” All the works of Leonid 
Madan, author of the Soviet Moldovan grammar, had been removed from the libraries by 
the end of 1934. By 1940, the Soviet special police on orders from the central Party 
leaders executed almost everyone participating in the process of cultural planning, 
including the First Secretaries of the local party organizations and chairs of the Central 
Executive Committee.56 
Thus, the creation of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
was an attempt to create a distinctive Moldovan nation in order to facilitate the 
annexation of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union and the dissemination of Communist 
propaganda into Romanian territories. In 1940, the Soviet Union achieved its goal and 
annexed Bessarabia. However, a lack of continuity in the implementation of the policies, 
indifference of the elites to the process of nationalization of the administrative apparatus, 
as well as resistance from the non-Moldovan population, resulted in the failure of the 
Moldovanisation of MASSR and creation of separate Moldovan nation. Thus, by the end 
of 1940, the process of nation building was compromised and “Moldovan culture” in 
MSSR became no more than Romanian.57  
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b. Moldova under the Soviet Union 
With the annexation of Bessarabia, the status of MSSR changed into a full 
subject and became a full member of the federation-the Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MSSR). 58 After WWII, the Bessarabian area of MSSR became the “fruits 
basket” of the Soviet Union, while the Transdniestrian region was highly industrialized 
and became one of the major parts of the Soviet military industry. That fact, combined 
with the demographic policies of the Soviet Union, created a division in the perception of 
their identities in these two regions. The author argues that, despite their national identity, 
the Transdniestrian population developed a strong affiliation with Soviet 
Internationalism, while Moldovans from the Bessarabian area identified themselves with 
MSSR, not the Soviet Union  or Romania, a factor that by the elites manipulated 
extremely well in order to secure their political and economic positions after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
As a result of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact, signed between the Soviet 
Union and Germany in August 1939, on June 20, 1940 Soviet troops annexed Bessarabia 
and it was automatically included in MASSR. Consequently, the population of 
Bessarabia underwent a new process of changing identity and attempts at assimilation. 
However, this time it was the process of de-Romanization combined with the process of 
Sovietization.  Moreover, the process of the creation of a Soviet identity was more 
successful in the Transdniestrian region in which Moscow concentrated the industrial 
potential of the Republic as well as a significant part of the Soviet military industry.  
Due  to its late annexation to the Soviet Union, as mentioned by Leonid 
Brezhnev, first secretary of the Communist Party in the MSSR from July 1950 to October 
1952, the Bessarabian part of the republic “had to break through to socialism by the 
shortest possible path,” which implied fast collectivization, industrialization and 
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internationalization.59 Transdniestrian territories already had undergone that process and 
viewed by Moscow as loyal citizens of the federation, while the population from the 
Bessarabian part, were still to be “educated” in the spirit of collectivism.  
That “shortest possible path” was very traumatic for the population of 
Bessarabia and resistance developed to the process of Sovietization in the Bessarabian 
part of MSSR. Immediately after the occupation of Bessarabia, the Soviet regime 
nationalized the land, enterprises and all means of production and implemented a process 
of Russification of the population.60 The Russian language became the official language 
of the Republic.  As a result, as Charles King pointed out, “by 1989 Moldovans were the 
third most Russified nationality in the Soviet Union; only in Ukraine and Belarus did a 
higher proportion of the titular nationality report Russian as their native language.”61 
These facts would play a significant role in the development of the Transdniestrian 
conflict. 
After 1950, MSSR became one of the largest agricultural centers of the 
Soviet Union. MSSR was only 0.2 percent of the Soviet territory. However, by the end of 
the 1970’s, it produced 10 percent of the union’s canned foods, 4.2 percent of vegetables, 
12.3 percent of fruits and 8.2 percent of wines.62 That production constituted 70 to 94 
percent of the total agricultural production of Moldavia and was mainly produced in the 
Bessarabian area of the republic. At the same time, the Transdniestrian region was highly 
industrialized, and after 1945, became one of the major regions of the Soviet defense and 
heavy industries. Almost 100 percent of Moldova’s machinery productions were exported 
outside the republic and most of these products were produced in Transdniestria. Some 
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four-fifth of the region’s population was employed in the industry, construction, and the 
service sector.63 Thus, as Charles King points out “the professional carriers, livelihoods, 
and even identities of its [Transdniestrian] inhabitants depended on their connection with 
the Soviet Center- the Communist Party, strategic industrial enterprises, and the military- 
not with local farmers and agricultural firms found west of the Dniester.”64 In that 
context, relationships with the center were of a vital importance for Transdniestria, while 
the rest of Moldova was not so strongly dependent on the center. 
In addition, postwar deportations and socioeconomic changes, imposed by 
the Central Communist administration, also caused significant demographic changes 
especially in the Transdniestrian region, reducing the numbers of Moldovans and 
increasing the Russian population. In 1936, Moldovans represented 41.8 percent of the 
Transdniestrian population while Ukrainians constituted 28.7 percent and Russians 14.2. 
By 1989, the Moldovan and Ukrainian population in the region dropped to 39.9 and 28.3 
percent accordingly, while the Russian population increased to 25.5. The majority of the 
Russian and Ukrainian population in the region were urban. In addition, most Ukrainians, 
as well as a large part of Moldovans from that territory, consider Russian their native 
language. 
In summary, the Soviet development of MSSR divided the republic into an 
industrial Transdniestria and agricultural Bessarabia. The Transdniestrian population 
developed an affiliation with the Soviet not Russian identity, and their economic security 
mostly depended on their connection to the Soviet center. At the same time, the 
population in the Bessarabian area considered MSSR their motherland. During the 
decline of the Soviet Union, the possibility for conflict or peace under such circumstances 
was dependent on the course of the elites and their inspirations.  
c. Who Is to Rule: Demography of Moldovan Elites 
All elites can be categorized in four main groups: traditional, neo-
traditional, exclusivist, and integrative. This categorization can be useful in analyzing the 
integrative capabilities of the minority groups or the possibilities for violence and 
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separatism of ethnic movements.65 A clash of interests, as a result of a potential change in 
the status of these categories, might create ethnic or civil conflicts, a fact that played a 
major role in the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova. Traditionally the 
Russian or Ukrainian elites appointed by the imperialist or Communist center ruled 
Moldova. The author argues that in the late 1980,s, the process of democratization 
[demokratizatsiya] brought new opportunities for indigenous elites to change the course 
of history and to take control of the political and economic development of the country; 
the process that threatened the monopoly of power of the old Communist nomenclatura. 
The struggle between these two elites finally resulted in the open conflict. 
As Philip Roeder mentioned, “a central element of the Soviet 
developmental strategy was the creation of political institutions that expanded the control 
of the regime over the process of social mobilization associated with modernization.”66 
Since the very beginning of the formation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic and throughout its entire history, Soviet Moldavia was traditionally dominated 
by the appointed Russian and Ukrainian elites or Transdniestrian bureaucrats.67 These 
elites were considered more educated and loyal to the central party apparatus than 
Bessarabian intellectuals. In addition, after the annexation of Bessarabia by the Soviet 
Union in 1940, and again in 1944, most of the local intelligentsia and administrators left 
for Romania or were deported by the new regime, thus leaving Bessarabia practically 
without an intelligentsia and significant elite class. Thus, traditionally, the Russians, 
Ukrainians, and Moldovans from the Transdniestrian area exercised authority in MSSR.  
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However, especially in the post WWII period, the Soviet regime extended 
its control over the subordinated Republics by politicizing the ethnicity. This policy was 
directed at the formation within each federal subject of the indigenous ethnic elite loyal to 
the regime. In the words of Philip Roeder  
the Soviet developmental strategy sought to control ethno-politics by 
prohibiting all but sanctioned political entrepreneurs from mobilizing their 
communities and by deterring these entrepreneurs from pursuing any but 
the regime’s instrumental strategies of plan fulfillment and social 
transformation.68  
The new category of elites was distinguished from the traditional because 
they were mainly born in the Bessarabian countryside, studied in the Chisinau University 
versus the Tiraspol Institute, and the majority spoke Moldovan. They had worked as 
raion and collective farm leaders and were very knowledgeable of the indigenous 
population.69 This type of elites came to power as a result of the preferential policy of the 
1960’s. Thus, by the end of the 1980’s, the Moldovans were dominating the MSSR 
Communist party apparatus, but were underrepresented in the leadership positions in the 
industrial sectors.70 Those positions were still held by the traditional elites loyal to the 
Communist center: Russians, Ukrainians and Transdniestrans. Under such conditions, the 
conflict between the elites over the control of the economic and political assets of the 
Republic in the period of liberalization and democratization could easily arise, with the 
possibility of the involvement of the large masses of population and the escalation of 
violence. 
The liberalization of political life in the Soviet Union contributed to the 
formation of the Moldovan “informal organizations,” in the summer of 1988, which later 
contributed to the formation of the Popular Front. These organizations were mostly 
oriented toward cultural awareness and were first organized as opposition to the 
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Moldovan Communist Party. In the beginning, these movements were more ethnically 
inclusive than exclusive. Leaders of these movements were oriented toward the 
mobilization of all citizens of MSSR toward democratization, restructuring and 
transparency. However, the introduction of the Language Law in 1989, “thus privileging 
the linguistic skills that urban Moldovans had maintained during their migration from the 
villages, held the promise of competitive advantage over urban Russians and other ethnic 
groups.”71 Moldovan was granted the status of a state language while Russian was the 
language of interethnic communication within MSSR. The Language Law also stipulated 
a path for the implementation of the legislation and five year period of transition. 
Significantly, a provision existed that the local administrations, with the approval of the 
Council of Ministers, could make Russian the language of the administration and 
industries. Thus, the workers could still use the same language and procedures as before. 
However, the managers and officials would have to learn the Moldovan language or lose 
their positions.72 
This situation not only threatened ethnic minorities, but also the future 
status of the traditional elites. In addition, the most radical elements of the new emerged 
elites, mostly members of the Popular Front, pledged the abolition of the Soviet 
Federation and union with Romania, while inclusive type elites promoted a policy of 
more cultural and economic independence from the restructured Soviet Union or 
Independent Moldova. Both these inspirations threatened the lifestyle of the 
Transdniestrian population, which, as discussed previously, was heavily dependent on the 
connections with the Soviet center, and the Soviet pragmatic nomenclature, which did not 
want to accept any changes and were devoted to the Communist ideology. Thus, what 
had in early 1989 appeared to be a unified organization, gathering members of the 
government, workers, peasants, and intellectuals under the broad banner of reform, 
rapidly disintegrated into various factions with competing goals and interests.  
In summary, as a result of historical developments, Soviet demographic 
manipulations and different approaches toward economic development of the regions of 
MSSR, by 1989, the Republic did not have a unified identity. Moreover, the 
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Transdniestrian population, including ethnic Moldovans, developed an affiliation with the 
Soviet Union and Soviet identity, while the rest of Moldavia viewed MSSR, including 
Transdniestria, as their motherland, not the Soviet Union or Romania.  However, these 
divergences were not deeply rooted in the Moldavian society. Therefore, during the 
decline of the Soviet state, the controversy of interests, not between the ethnic 
communities, but between traditional and neotraditional or indigenous elites, as well as 
within the last, created a situation of competition over the future economic and political 
capital of Moldova, which in the end, resulted in a military confrontation and long lasting 
conflict.  
B. TO BE OR NOT TO BE: INDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICT  
In the late 1980’s, in the Republic of Moldova, many different political actors 
largely supported national renaissance: political, economic, and cultural reforms. The 
main reason for such widespread support was often not national sentiment of those actors 
but mainly a possibility to secure or increase their own political and economic security in 
the difficult years of transition from the authoritarian power of the Soviet government to 
a situation unknown to everyone. This chapter argues than when the course of the 
development of the Republic of Moldova took a different path from the traditional, and 
threatened the future economic and social situation of the traditional elites, these elites 
mobilized instrumental and primordial grievances of the population in order to secure 
their political situation and to take advantage of the opened economic opportunities after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and its command economy. In response, the new 
nationally oriented elites viewed the demands of the old nomenclatura as a intent to 
reinstall the domination of the former patrons, which fact created a security dilemma, 
escalating to the point of military confrontation. As a proximate cause of this conflict, 
which had an enormous implication on its development, was the interest of the Russian 
Federation in maintaining Moldova under its political military and economic influence. 
Thus, this conflict was an ethnic conflict. However, it is mainly provoked by the 
competition between traditional and new-emerged elites over the future politico-
economic control over the region. In support of the author’s argument, this chapter 
discusses four underling factors of the conflict: structural, political, economic and 
cultural factors and their role in triggering the conflict.  
34 
1. Structural Factors of the Conflict 
All three structural factors of the development of Transdniestrian conflict, state 
weakness, intrastate security concerns, and ethnic geography facilitated the eruption of 
conflict and highlight the elite’s manipulation of this conflict. The author argues that 
Moldova emerged as a weak state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which 
permitted traditional elites to mobilize instrumental and primordial grievances of the 
Transdniestrian population against national inspirations of the rest of Moldova, thus 
creating a security dilemma, which resulted in open confrontation and military conflict. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, in most cases, the states that emerged were 
weak states. They emerged with only basic political institutions in place. Under such 
conditions, power struggles between former and new elites intensify, thus increasing the 
independency of the regional leaders. In cases were those regional leaders can exercise 
control over the military assets, the conflict might easily escalate to military 
confrontation.  In such situations, the security concerns of the groups within the state 
intensify, creating a security dilemma, which also might result in the intensification of the 
military preparation of the different ethnic groups. If so, ethnic geography, the last 
structural fact can play a major role in the spiral of conflict. The effect of ethnic 
geography depends on the distribution of ethnicities as some states are intermingled, 
while in others, minorities are concentrated in separate provinces or regions of the 
country. In that context, countries with intermingled ethnicities are less vulnerable to 
secessionist movements.73  
The Republic of Moldova emerged from the Soviet Union as a very weak state. 
Most of the political institutions were not in place. The police forces and military units 
during the military confrontation were only in the beginning stages. The state authorities 
lacked professionalism at that level and could not exercise control over the territory under 
their supervision. Under such conditions, the traditional Communist elites, in the position 
to control the industrial sector of Moldova, mainly dislocated in the Transdniestrian 
region, saw their opportunity to take control of the region. With the silent support of the 
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Russian Federation, which had control over the military assets in the region, 
Transdniestrian authorities consolidated control over a significant number of these assets, 
and used them to trigger the conflict. Thus, after the proclamation of independence from 
MSSR, Transdniestrian authorities started to mobilize and arm informal military units 
and to take over police stations and administrative institutions along the east bank of the 
Dniester River. The Soviet Fourteenth Army, dislocated in the Transdniestrian region, 
was very significant in the future development of the conflict. Accordingly, most 
weapons of illegal formations and the newly formed Dniester Guard were taken from the 
storage areas of that army. The commandment of the Transdniestrian Army also came 
from the officers of the Fourteenth Army. Many officers were transferred to the 
Transdniestrian units. In such situations, the conflict had all the indicators of escalating 
into armed confrontation. 
Accordingly, with the acceptance of the society of the Declaration of 
independence, Moldova interrupted the control from the Union Center, which threatened 
the Transdniestrian elites, who were strongly dependent on the center, with a loss of 
authority not only in the Republic of Moldova, but also in the Transdniestrian region. 
Thus, taking into consideration the demographics of the Transdniestrian region, the main 
reason for conflict implied by the Transdniestrian leaders was the protection of all Slavs 
against Moldovan discrimination, providing the opportunity to speculate on the ethnic 
grievances of the population. Interestingly, 70 percent of the Slav population of the 
Republic of Moldova lives in the western area and peacefully coexist with the 
Moldovans. Thus, if the repression of the Slavs had occurred, the conflict had to emerge 
or shift also to the western part of the country, but it did not, which means that despite its 
ethnic spillover, the real causes of the conflict are more than just ethnic confrontation.  
The first serious hostilities between government forces and Transdniestrian 
paramilitaries took place on December 13, 1991, when Moldovan police attempted to 
disarm Transdniestrian irregulars. During the night of March 2, 1992, Transdniestrian 
paramilitaries attacked and occupied the Dubasari police station. It was evident, as  
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mentioned in the Moldovan Government’s Declaration, that this action’s goal was the 
further aggravation of the political situation, undermining the Republic’s sovereignty and 
Moldova’s admission to the United Nation Organization scheduled for March 2, 1992.74  
With the introduction of the Language Law in 1989, the reforms in MSSR were 
seen by the Transdniestrian elites as evidence of Moldova’s intention to abandon the 
Soviet Union and as “shifting balance of power to the Moldovan majority and away from 
those groups that had traditionally exercised authority,”75 thus raising concerns about the 
future development of these groups. However, as mentioned in the previous section, the 
language law mainly affected only the managers, not the entire population. Under these 
circumstances, the Transdniestrian elites took steps to protect themselves, which in 
response, raised concerns of the Moldovan administration, who saw the demand and 
actions of the Transdniestrian administration as an attempt of the old Soviet regime to 
impose control over the country again. This elite-manipulated security dilemma resulted 
in the military confrontation.  
Thus, Moldova during the conflict, was a weak state. The process of national 
independency and cultural rebirth created an intrastate security concern mainly on the 
side of the former elite. The actions taken by the old elites, in order to secure their status 
in the society, and the response from the central administration, created a security 
dilemma, which in the end, resulted in open military confrontation.   
2.  Economic/Social Factor 
The aim of Gorbaciov’s economic reforms of the 1980’s was to bring the Soviet 
economy into a new waive of economic development and modernization. However, 
during the late 1980’s, the economic situation in the Soviet Union deteriorated, which 
impacted the politico-economic situation in Moldova as well. The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and collapse of the centralized Soviet economy aggravated the economic 
situation even more. Under such conditions, Transdniestria, which heavily relied on the 
Soviet Center, became even more economically destabilized. In addition, Russians  
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viewed the introduction of the language law in Moldova, establishing Moldovan as an 
official language of the country, as the formation of an economic system that would 
disadvantage them. Indeed, these facts contributed to the aggravation of the situation.  
The scholars of conflict resolution identified three economic and social factors 
that can trigger ethnic and internal conflicts: economic problems, discriminatory 
economic systems, and the tribulations of economic development and modernization. The 
economic problems can be deeply destabilizing and can facilitate the spark of violence.76 
In the post Soviet areas, the collapse of the planed economy created a large spectrum of 
economic problems from inflation to the dramatically high rate of unemployment, which 
in many cases, triggered the conflicts. The author argues that in the Transdniestrian 
conflict, one of the main causes was the economic aspirations of the Transdniestrian 
elites. 
The discriminatory economic systems also might trigger the conflict. Unfair 
distributions of resources and economic systems that disadvantage certain members of 
the society have the potential to increase the dissatisfaction of these members of society 
leading to the potential for escalation into a conflict.  The last cause is economic 
development and modernization. Many authors argue that economic development and 
modernization create many social changes. These include migration and urbanization 
effects on existing family rights and existing social systems and the question of the 
relevance of traditional political institutions. Education and improved access to mass 
media raise awareness of the structure of the society and each individual’s place in it, 
thus also creating the possibility for conflict.77  
In the republic of Moldova, two thirds of its industrial potential is concentrated in 
Transdniestria and the development of Moldova cannot be efficient without the 
Transdniestrian Region. Thus, in these moments of turmoil, the person controlling the 
Transdniestria region will have the real potential to exercise influence over the entire 
development of Moldova. As Michael Brown argues, the economic development always 
benefits some individuals or groups, but those who are on top from the beginning have 
                                                 
76 For more information on that subject, see R. de A. Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan, eds., 
Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict, (London, Printer Publishers, 1991). 
77 Michael Brown, op. cit., 217. 
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better economic opportunities than others.78 On the other hand, political elites from 
Moldova also understood that without control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova 
will be an agrarian country, and moreover, will depend on the Transdniestrian 
administration for their connections with the CIS markets.  
The peak of the conflict occurred in July 1992 when Transdniestrian forces 
launched an attack to seize the last remaining police station in Bender, a Moldovan city 
located on the west bank of the Nistru River, which is not part of any historical 
Transdniestrian territory. Moldova responded with a massive military attack, which 
included mortar attacks and dropping bombs from the airplanes. However, because of the 
involvement of Russian regular troops, Moldovan forces were defeated.79 Bender is the 
main connecting point of all the roads and railroads as well as one of the major industrial 
areas of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, the separatists’ successful attempt to capture that 
city and Moldova’s massive efforts to regain it demonstrates the economic inspirations of 
the Transdniestrian and Moldovan elites. Indeed, the involvement of the Russian troops 
and defeat of the Moldovan military in the Bender operation did lead to the cease-fire and 
introduction of a peacekeeping contingent from the Russian Federation, the Republic of 
Moldova and the unrecognized Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic.   
To conclude, the benefits that can be extracted from control over the 
economically developed and strategically positioned region of Moldova were enormous. 
Thus, from an economic point of view, the conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the 
Republic of Moldova (RM) was triggered by the elite’s inspirations to take advantage of 
new economic opportunities while preserving or improving their old political status. 
3. Political Factors 
The most important political factors in the Transdniestrian conflict are the elites’ 
politics and intergroup politics. Change in the balance of power between the groups 
destabilized the situation between the groups, and the elites used that destabilization to 
mobilize ethnic grievances to their benefit. The author argues that in the Transdniestrian  
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case, the most important political factor lies at the level of elite politics reinforced by the 
proximate cause of this conflict, which is Russian interest in maintaining political, 
economic and military domination over the region. 
During the Soviet era, Russians were the majority in the country. This position 
was affiliated with certain political and economic benefits. In the Republic of Moldova, 
most Russophons traditionally living in the cities were employed in the industry and 
service sectors, and had more opportunities for education and employment. 80 In addition, 
the cultural development of Moldova was mainly oriented toward Russification. In that 
context, the changes of the late 1980s, which culminated in the proclamation of 
independence and the rebirth of nationalistic inspirations, suddenly transformed the status 
of Russians and Russofons from a majority into a minority, thus also threatening their 
political and economic benefits from the old system and creating premises for conflict.  
The elite politics is basically characterized by the relations and interests between 
the traditional conservative old style Soviet elite and the neo-traditional or “pragmatic” 
elite, who emerged particularly during the Gorbachov era. The neo-traditional elite are 
characterized by its inclination to compromises, understanding of new realities, and 
openness to the West, democratic development and the free market. However, they 
lacked experience, competence, and sometimes determination to confront the other type 
of elites. In contrast, the old conservative members of the Soviet nomenclatura could not 
see their future without a totalitarian political regime. Thus, it was not capable of 
compromising and was firmly in favor of the old Communist ideology and perception of 
the world.81 In that context, in the Transdniestrian conflict, the traditional elites, who 
were losing power over the region, triggered the instrumental and ethnic grievances of the 
population in order to secure their life style, and at the same time, to challenge Moldova’s 
orientation. However, these grievances were not deeply entrenched, and even more, have 
arisen mostly because of the propaganda, heavily implied by the Tiraspol administration, 
                                                 
80 The term Russofons is used primarily for other non titular nationalities mainly using Russian as its 
primary language of communication. In MSSR, minorities were, in most of cases, using Russian as their 
language of communication, thus Russofons are much more that just Russians and can also include 
representatives of the titular nationality. 
81 Hryhory, Perepelitsya, “The Influence of Regional Factors on Possible Scenarios of Development of 
Moldovan-Transdniestrian-Ukrainian Relations,” in New Borders in South Eastern Europe: The Republic 
of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, ed Institute for Public Policy, (Chisinau, Stiinta, 2002), 279. 
40 
and as soon as the cease-fire was achieved, the relationship between the populations of 
the two Dniester sides returned to normal. Thus, the Transdniestrian conflict is an internal 
elite driven conflict, which involved the confrontation of the civilian leaders over the 
future orientation of the RM and distribution of political and economic power in the 
newly emerged state. 
Russian interest in maintaining its influence over Moldova was a proximate cause 
of this conflict, more fully discussed in Chapter IV. However, the distant powers can 
facilitate the conflict only when the premises for conflict already exist in the target 
country.82 As was discussed previously, internal factors that triggered the conflict were 
more than enough. However, Russian support of the Transdniestrian elites and of the 
perception that this conflict is a “war for protection of all Slavs” contributed to its 
aggravation and transformation into an armed confrontation. Russian interest after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union was to maintain the former Soviet Republics under its 
political, military and economic influence. The geographic and economic situation of the 
Transdniestrian region made it a “key” to the development of Moldova. Thus, by 
destabilizing Transdniestria and exercising control over the administration of that region, 
Russia could exercise enormous influence on the political decisions of Moldova, a fact 
supported by the development of Moldova in the post-conflict period. In that context, the 
Russian military, political and economic support of the Transdniestrian separatist 
authorities and its interests “weigh more” as a result of the ethnic causes of this conflict.  
Thus, intergroup politics did provide leverage for the initiation of an ethnic 
conflict. However, the cornerstone was the struggle between traditional elites, supported 
by Russian interests of maintaining dominance over the region, and “pragmatic,” 
nationally oriented elites over the future political and economic control of the region. 
4. Cultural/Perceptual Factor 
Two main cultural factors that can trigger conflict were identified: cultural 
discrimination against minorities and group histories and group perceptions. In the 
Transdniestrian case, both factors play a role. However, they were not the main causes of 
the conflict.83 
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In the late 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s, the Republic of Moldova 
underwent a process of national rebirth. However, rapid Romanization of Moldovan 
society was the negative aspect of that process contributing to the escalation of the 
conflict.  With the proclamation of the Moldovan language, written with the Latin script, 
similar to Romanian, as the official language, the Chisinau administration practically 
limited the possibilities of the Russian speaking minorities, especially in the 
Transdniestrian region, to participate in the cultural and information environment of the 
RM. The local councils of the Transdniestrian region strongly resisted the Language Law.  
They voted that the law would not apply in the region. Since that moment, the 
Transdniestrian leaders started their preparation for secession. In January 1990, the 
United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK) healed a referendum on Transdniestrian 
autonomy. Ninety six percent of the voters favored Transdniestrian autonomy within 
MSSR, and if necessary, separation in the future. However, as Kaufman mentions, “the 
Tiraspol press was telling voters that the alternatives to independence was to submit to a 
‘new inquisition’ by Moldovan authorities, and eventually to be swallowed up in an 
extremely nationalistic Romania.”84 Thus, the introduction of the Language Law, 
reinforced by the false interpretation of it by the Tiraspol authorities, in fact increased the 
hostile attitude of the Transdniestrian Russian speaking portion of the population toward 
the RM and served as one of the causes of conflict.   
Historically, Moldovan identity was not united. However, most of the time, 
Moldova was dominated by the Russians and Russofons elites, and the Russian speaking 
population had more social and economic benefits. In that context, even though Moldova 
was fourth most Russified republic in the Soviet Union, the Moldovan perception of 
Russians as dominators was apparent. At the same time, Moldova’s inspirations toward 
the rebirth of its Romanian nature and the fast development of the cultural and political 
rapprochement with Romania, with the help of the elites, awoke Transdniestrian 
historical grievances toward Romania, which were especially reinforced by the events 
during WWII, discussed in the previous subchapter. Tiraspol elites, by controlling the 
media in the region, created the image of Moldova as a Romanian aggressor and 
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mobilized the historical grievances of the Transdniestrian population. In response, despite 
the warm attitude of the Moldovans toward the Russian speaking population, 
Transdniestrian hostilities triggered Moldova’s perceptions of secular domination by 
Russia and was viewed as one more attempt to undermine Moldova’s independence and 
reinstall Russian control, thus creating a security dilemma.  
Thus, from the cultural perceptional factor, this conflict can be characterized as an 
ethnic conflict. However, note that the grievances were not rooted in Moldovan society 
and were mostly created by Transdniestrian propaganda. One fact that is more favorable 
is the involvement of different nationalities on both sides of the conflict and attitudes of 
the simple people involved in the conflict, who did not want to fight.85  In fact, the ethnic 
aspect of this conflict is more tactical, applied by the Transdniestrian elites to achieve 
their goal of control of the Transdniestrian region, resulting in the possibility to extract 
political and economic benefits, as well as control over the future development of 
Moldova. 
In conclusion, the historical development of Bessarabia and Transdniestria, as 
well as their interaction since the first annexation of Bessarabia by Russia in 1812 and up 
to 1992, when the military conflict erupted in the region, suggests that Russian and 
Romanian policies of the Russification and Romanization of Bessarabia, as well as the 
Soviet policy of Moldovanisation and later Sovietization, did not create a unified 
Moldovan identity, a factor, which in late the 1980’s, contributed to the emergence of an 
armed confrontation in the region. However, by analyzing the underling factors that 
triggered this conflict, the structural, economic, political and cultural factors, it is obvious 
that the conflict was an ethnic in nature, but was mainly caused by the elites struggle over 
the future economic control of the new formed country, reinforced by the proximate 
cause, which is Russian aspirations to maintain political, economic and military 
dominance over the regions. These causes and aspirations of the elites from both areas, as 
well as permanent Russian interest in maintaining its dominance over the region in the  
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end, will contribute to the prolongation of the political settlement of conflict and create a 
deadlock situation, difficult to resolve even after a decade of permanent negotiations. 
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III. POST- CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: POSITIONS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL ACTORS 
Resolving a civil war is never simply a matter of reaching a bargain and 
then instituting a ceasefire. To be successful, a civil war peace settlement 
must consolidate the previously warring factions into a single state, build a 
new government capable of accommodating their interests, and create a 
new national nonpartisan military force.86  
Barbara F. Walter 
Distant powers and the international community in general are not as 
helpless as the conventional wisdom might lead as to believe. To the 
contrary, they mark moments when distant international powers can use 
their leverage and influence the course of events.87 
Michael Brown 
 
Chapter III analyses the process of the post- conflict resolution procedures during 
the last decade, stressing the positions and development of the internal actors: the 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) and the Republic of Moldova (RM).  
The military defeat of Moldova in Bender and the involvement of the Russian 
troops in the conflict, forced the Moldovan government to search for support to stop the 
violence. As a result, many attempts were made at the national and international level to 
find a plausible solution to this conflict. However, most of the proposals, which assumed 
international involvement, were opposed by the Russian federation, a fact that in the end 
led to the acceptance of the Russian plan for settlement of the dispute. The Moldova and 
Russian Federation signed “Convention regarding the principles of a peaceful resolution 
of the armed conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova,” in July 
1992, which led to the cease-fire between the conflicting parties and the introduction of 
peacekeeping forces.  
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According to Nicole Ball88, in the countries that have emerged from the conflict 
based on a negotiated settlement, two stages of the peace process can be identified: 
cessation of conflict and peace building. Each of these two stages also has other two 
component steps. The aim of the first stage is to stop the fighting and direct the conflict 
through political channels. Its phases comprise negotiations and the formal cessation of 
hostilities. The peacebuilding phase is also composed of two steps: transition and 
consolidation. Thus, Ball argues that 
on strengthening political institutions, consolidating internal security, and 
revitalizing the economy and society. The major objectives during the 
transition phase are to establish a government with a sufficient degree of 
legitimacy to operate effectively and to implement key reforms mandated 
by the peace accords. The first major objective during the consolidation 
phase is to continue the reforms.89   
However, for the aforementioned process to start, it is first necessary for all 
parties in the conflict to be wiling to reevaluate their attitudes toward the conflict. 
According to Saadia Touval and William Zartman, two conditions are very encouraging 
in such a process: mutually hurting stalemates and crises bounded by a deadline.90 As the 
authors point out: 
a mutually hurting stalemate begins when one side realizes that it is unable 
to achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or win the conflict by itself; the 
stalemate is completed when the other side reaches a similar conclusion.91 
The cease-fire agreement between the Transdniestria authorities and the 
administration of Republic of Moldova was signed more than a decade ago. However, the 
peacebuilding process did not move forward very much, and it is still at the start of the 
transitional phase.  
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This chapter argues that the aforementioned Convention was not a negotiated 
settlement of the conflict but strengthened the capitulation of the Republic of Moldova. 
The Republic of Moldova accepted a special status as a Transdniestrian region, allowing 
TMR to maintain its own militaries, accepted the presence of the Russian Federation 
military forces on its territory for an unlimited period of time, and excluded Romania, its 
natural ally, from the peace process and was practically left alone to confront political, 
military and economic pressures from the Russian Federation. In addition, the 
introduction of the peacekeeping forces, despite their contribution to the cease-fire and 
normalization of the situation on both sides of the Dniester River, created a status quo 
situation, which benefits the Transdniestrian authorities. As a result, post-conflict 
negotiations are characterized by Moldova’s promotion of the policy of inclusion in an 
attempt to regain the lost territory, and Transdniestrian unwillingness to surrender 
anything achieved by military means, thus favoring the secession, or at least confederal 
arrangements, between the two subjects of international law. In such situations, the 
involvement of the international community is very important. 
The chapter will conclude that Transdniestrian illegal administration, which is 
still composed of the same leadership that started the conflict, has built a de facto 
independent authoritarian state based on old Soviet ideology and developed economic 
and social interests in preserving the conflict. The status quo situation, created around 
this conflict, perfectly suits the aforementioned interests, thus encouraging them to 
promote a radical position toward the process of negotiations and to demand anything but 
independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the legal Moldovan Government. In 
contrast, Moldova underwent several changes in the administration and practically 
eliminated all the causes that triggered the conflict. However, it could not demonstrate 
the superiority of the democratic development, thus losing the support of the population. 
Under such conditions, a political solution to the conflict is difficult to achieve. As a 
result of the failure of locally driven conflict-resolution process, international 
involvement becomes even more important and is the only path to follow. 
A. POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEFEAT OF MOLDOVA  
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, on July 21, 1992, the Republic of 
Moldova and the Russian Federation signed the “Convention regarding the principles of a 
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peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of 
Moldova,” which conducted the cease-fire between the conflicting parties and the 
introduction of peacekeeping forces. This chapter argues that this Convention was not a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict but the straight capitulation of the Republic of 
Moldova. In addition, the introduction of the three-lateral peacekeeping forces, from 
Russia, Moldova and the Transdniestrian region, despite their contribution to the cease-
fire and normalization of the situation on the both sides of the Dniester River, created a 
status quo situation, which benefits Transdniestrian authorities.  
This section will conclude that because of the Russian interest in maintaining 
dominance over the region, and the international environment at the time, the Republic of 
Moldova was forced to accept the Russian proposal of settlement of the conflict, it was 
mainly a capitulation, and not a negotiated settlement. In addition, the operational 
characteristics and composition of the peacekeeping forces, as well as the partial attitude 
of the Russian forces created a status quo situation, which benefited the Transdniestrian 
authorities, but undermined the process of negotiation.  
1. Cease-Fire Agreement or Capitulation? 
Moldovan intentions to stop the violent conflict in the Transdniestrian region by 
peaceful means started before a major military confrontation erupted. On March 23, 
1992, during the CSCE Conference in Helsinki, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Russia, Ukraine Romania and Moldova agreed to form a quadripartite forum for the 
settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. The Forum issued a declaration that stipulated 
the main principles of the conflict settlement: 1) unconditional respect of the territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova; 2) conflict 
resolution should be exclusively by political means; 3) right of the constitutional organs 
of the Republic of Moldova to intervene in order to maintain legal order in accordance 
with the norms of international law; 4) inadmissibility of military intervention and other 
involvement in the conflict by any foreign powers.92 The Parliament of the Republic of 
Moldova welcomed the formation of the forum and agreed to all its stipulations. In  
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addition, the Parliament sent a request to the Unified Military Commend of the CIS to 
withdraw the Fourteenth Soviet Army from the territory of the independent Republic of 
Moldova, which at the time, was under its command.    
In April 1992, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Ukraine, Romania and 
Moldova signed five important documents, in Chisinau, the capital city of Moldova, 
which once again were directed to stop the military confrontation between the conflicting 
parties. In addition, they formed a Mixed Quadripartite Commission for the settlement of 
the disputes and rejected the proposal of the Russian Federation to give the Fourteenth 
Army the status of a peacekeeping force, because of the involvement of some elements of 
that Army in the military conflict. However, the unwillingness of the Transdniestrian 
unauthorized government considerably reduced their efficacy, reinforced by the open 
support from the military commandment of the Fourteenth Army, to solve the conflict by 
peaceful means. 
On June 15, 1992, during the Quadripartite Commission’s meeting in Tiraspol, 
the capital city of the Transdniestrian region, another accord was signed that stipulated 
the same basic principles of a peaceful resolution of the military conflict. Significantly, 
the chiefs of public administrations of most of the east raions and major cities (Tiraspol, 
Ribnita, Dubasari and Bender) have also signed this accord, thus expressing the 
willingness of the Transdniestrian population to restore peace.  Besides, this document 
stipulated the need to form a new Government of reconciliation, based on the 
proportional representation of all nationalities in all government institutions. The accord 
was ratified by the Moldovan Parliament on June 16 and was a real chance for a political 
and military solution to the conflict.93 However, the central Transdniestrian separatist 
administration rejected this accord, demonstrating the unwillingness of the 
Transdniestrian authorities to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. 
Furthermore, on June 19, Transdniestrian Forces, using armored vehicles from 
Russian army depots, stormed the last remaining area loyal to the Chisinau government 
police station in Bender. As Bender was a strategic military and economic point, the 
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Moldovan government attempted to regain control over the territory and retaliate.94 
However, the open intervention of the Fourteenth Russian Army, alongside 
Transdniestrian paramilitaries and Cossacks units from Russia, resulted in the defeat of 
Moldovan units and their retreat from the city.95 The Moldovan defeat in Bender marked 
the highest point of the conflict and secured official involvement of the Russian 
Federation in the dispute.96   
In the spring of 1992, the Russian Federation applied many available means to 
maintain Moldova under its sphere of influence. It was exercising pressure on the 
Moldovan government to sign the CIS accord, mainly dominated by the Russian interest 
in the former Soviet Union Republics. Russian officials imposed an economic blockade 
on the Republic of Moldova and threatened military intervention, indicating that Russia 
was, in fact, involved in the Transdniestrian conflict and not interested in its solution, but 
only on its terms.   
During the reunion of the top officials of CIS in Moscow on July 6, 1992, a 
proposal was introduced for international forces to stop the violence in the Republic of 
Moldova. A new attempt to identify possible solutions to the Transdniestrian conflict was 
made during the CSCE reunion in Helsinki on July 9-10, 1992. Bulgarian President Jelio 
Jelev proposed a project, which attempted to find a plausible solution to the conflict in 
Moldova, under the lead of the CSCE. However, the Russian Federation again firmly 
opposed that project , which proposed finding a solution, limiting participation only to 
the CIS countries, thus excluding Romania and Bulgaria from the peace-resolution 
process, and was not endorsed by the CSCE. The Russian delegation blocked the  
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adoption of an official document on this issue. It was evident that Russian Federation had 
special interest in this conflict and did not want involvement of the international 
community.97 
In addition to the given circumstances, the Transdniestrian conflict, developed at 
the same time while the United Nation’s capacity to undertake new peacekeeping 
missions ha been taxed to the limit, the Republic of Moldova was not was of the main 
interests of the United States, and the OSCE did not have the necessary mechanisms to 
undertake such a mission. However, even if the necessary political weal would have been 
for international intervention, the Russian Federation, which had veto power in both the 
UN and CSCE, would have categorically opposed it. These conditions at the international 
level limited Moldova’s chances to obtain international involvement, thus increasing the 
chances of the Russian plans.98  
As a result, Russian diplomacy prevailed and, on July 21, 1992, Russian president 
Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan president Mircea Snegur, with the participation of Igor 
Smirnov, leader of the separatist region of Transdniestria, signed the “Convention 
regarding the principles of peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in the 
Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova.” In accordance with the 
aforementioned Convention, the parties, the Republic of Moldova and Russian 
Federation, agreed to take all necessary actions to broker a cease-fire and not take any 
other military actions against the other party, to withdraw military and paramilitary units 
as well as military equipment, and to create a security zone. The boundaries of the 
security zone had to be established by the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which would 
assume control over the implementation of the Convention and had to be created from 
representatives of the three parties involved in the conflict resolution, the Russian 
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Federation, the Republic of Moldova, and the separatist forces of the Transdniestrian 
region. The JCC was delegated responsibility to form a peacekeeping contingent and to 
coordinate all necessary measures, including the activities of the military observers. 
Consensus was also required for all JCC decisions.99 
In summary, the aforementioned Convention was not a negotiated compromise 
between Transdniestria and Moldova, but was an act of capitulation of Moldova to 
Russia. As Richard Betts mentions “there are two ways to stop a war: either one side 
imposes its will after defeating the other on the battlefield, or both sides accept a 
negotiated compromise.”100 Signing the aforementioned Convention suggests a 
negotiated compromise. Neither side de jure has won. The Transdniestrian separatists did 
not achieve their goal of separation and the Moldovan legal authorities did not reestablish 
legal control over the territories east of the Dniester River. However, de facto 
Transdniestrian separatist authorities with support from the Russian Federation have won 
the war. They achieved recognition of special status within Moldova and total control 
over the captured territories. Moreover, by signing this Convention, the Republic of 
Moldova accepted the special status of the Transdniestrian region and its military 
formations, the presence of the military forces of the Russian Federation on the territory 
for an unlimited period of time, and excluded Romania, its natural ally from the peace 
process and practically was left alone to confront political, military and economic 
pressures from the Russian Federation. Practically, the Republic of Moldova, because of 
the direct involvement of the Russian Federation in internal affairs, did not negotiate a 
compromise but lost the war against Transdniestrian separatism and was forced to 
capitulate, reinforced by the structure and operational characteristics of the peacekeeping 
mission, and discussed in the next section. However, despite all strategic disadvantages 
leading to the signing of the aforementioned Convention for the Republic of Moldova, it 
did contribute to the end of violence, the improvement of the political climate, and 
overall, to the return to a peaceful environment.   
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2. Peacekeeping as a Shield for Transdniestrian State Building 
The conventional wisdom is that peacekeeping creates better conditions for 
negotiation and reconciliation between the disputants.101 Another approach is that 
peacekeeping operations actually inhibit negotiations or lead to their stagnation. 
Peacekeeping, according to this approach, removes the necessity for immediate political 
resolution, thus removing some of the incentives for negotiations or concessions.102 
Thus, in some cases, decreasing the level of hostility creates difficulties in achieving a 
final resolution to the conflict.103 The author argues that the Moldovan peacekeeping 
operation is an example that mostly fits the second approach. It contributed to the 
normalization of life on both sides of the Dniester River, and at the same time, created a 
status quo situation, which is still preferred by the Transdniestrian administration and 
serves as a shield for its state building.  
With the introduction of the peacekeeping forces, the conflicting parties took 
significant steps in withdrawing their personnel and military equipment from the 
occupied position. Life on both sides of the river began to return to normal as the parties 
unblocked the roads, conducted a significant campaign to clear the minefields and to 
confiscate illegally possessed weapons. Some refugees returned to their homes.  Since 
1992, the cease fire was never broken, and none of the incidents were related to the 
conflict. As a result, the economic development of both regions improved in comparison 
to  the period of conflict. Peacekeeping forces were involved in many of the 
aforementioned processes. Thus, the introduction of peacekeeping forces overall 
contributed to the normalization of the situation in the region. 
Neutrality and operational characteristics are two of the most important conditions 
for successful peacekeeping missions. Paul F. Diehl mentions three major means of 
neutrality: 1) the troops cannot be drawn from states that have an interest in the conflict at 
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hand; 2) peacekeeping forces should not rely on personnel from the major power states, 
especially the superpowers; and 3) neutrality in composition is suppose to guarantee 
neutrality in behavior- that the peacekeeping force will not favor one protagonist over 
another.104 The same author points out that command, control, and coordination of the 
peacekeeping mission also significantly contributes to its overall success.105 If these 
conditions are not respected, the peacekeeping operation, he argues, cannot be successful 
and mostly does not contribute to the final solution of the conflict, but creates a status 
quo situation that might be preferred by one or both of the parties. 
In the case of the peacekeeping operation in Moldova, none of these means of 
neutrality and operational control were respected. The military formations from both 
parties in the conflict were transformed into peacekeepers and involved in the decision-
making process, the Russian federation was interested in the conflict, and the Russian 
troops favored Transdniestrians over the Moldovans. This combination of factors created 
a status quo situation, which was a good alternative for the Transdniestrian administration 
to seriously negotiate or renew fighting.   
The peacekeeping contingents from the Russian Federation, the Republic of 
Moldova and the separatist Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) had been 
deployed in the security zone during July 31- August 4, 1992.106 Peacekeeping troops 
from the Russian Federation and TMR were on the left bank of the river and the Russian 
Federation and Republic of Moldova were on the right bank.107 Thus, no Moldovan  
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troops were allowed on the left side of the Dniester River, a fact that from the very 
beginning created the necessary conditions for the Tiraspol authorities to build their 
political and military potential separately from the central Moldovan government.  
As mentioned previously, the JCC was also created from the representatives of 
Moldova, TMR and the Russian Federation. The decisions are taken by consensus. Thus, 
it is obvious that their interests guide the conflicting parties, a fact that, in most of the 
cases, creates a dead lock situation in the decision-making process. As a result, as 
Gheorghe Roman, the Moldovan co-chairman of the Joint Control Commission 
mentioned in July 2000 
contrary to its status, the peacekeeping contingent did not exert a real 
control in the security zone. Neither the peacekeepers nor the JCC holds 
accurate information regarding Tiraspol paramilitary forces in the security 
zone, the number of or armament available.108  
Thus, the operational control of the peacekeeping forces is also contributing to the 
creation of the status quo situation, which benefits the Transdniestrian administration.  
As mentioned previously as well, the main component of the peacekeeping forces 
was from the Russian Federation, which was directly involved in the conflict with evident 
interests in it. Taking into consideration that the other two contingents are from 
conflicting parties, the role of the Russian contingent becomes even more important as its 
neutrality is the main factor of the peace process. However, Russian activities in that 
operation are anything but neutral as they permanently ignore Transdniestrian violations 
of the truce agreement, support the Transdniestrian administration, and occasionally 
interfere with the OSCE Observer Mission’s efforts to investigate Transdniestrian 
behavior.109 Shortly after the introduction of the peacekeeping forces, the Transdniestrian 
separatist government, with a silent blessing of the Russian troops, peacekeepers as well 
as the leadership of the Fourteenth Army started to form more military formations in the  
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Security Zone, thus consolidating their positions against a constitutional government of 
Moldova.110 Thus, that conclusion may be that Russian peacekeeping forces served as a 
shield for Transdniestrian state building. 
Furthermore, by the end of 1994, the Russian Federation, contrary to the 
“Convention regarding the principles of a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in the 
Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova,” signed on July 21, 1992, unilaterally 
withdrew four of the six peacekeeping battalions leaving a military contingent of only 
650 personnel in that area. Official explanation for the downsizing of the Russian 
peacekeeping contingent was a lack of financial resources to support it.111 However, by 
that time, the Transdniestrian Armed Forces were based on the strength of Moldova’s 
government forces. The Republic of Moldova protested the unilateral actions of the 
Russian Federations fearful “that it was losing an important buffer between its military 
and the superior Transdniestrian forces, which appeared poised to occupy the positions 
vacated by the departing Russian units.”112 Currently, all parties reduced their 
peacekeeping forces to the strength of 450-500 personnel. Consequently, the 
Transdniestrian separatist authorities and Moldova’s constitutional government withdrew 
all their armored personnel carriers (APC), leaving only Russian APCs in the 
peacekeeping contingent.113 On the other hand, Transdniestrian non-peacekeeping forces 
are still located in the Security Zone. These facts once again demonstrate Russian support 
for Transdniestrian authorities.  
In summary, the cease-fire agreement in July 1992 was an act of capitulation of 
the Republic of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova at the time accepted the only 
available solution because of Russian interference in the  peace settlement process and 
unwillingness of the international community to challenge Russian dominance. However, 
it has to be acknowledged that the introduction of the peacekeeping forces facilitated the 
implementation of the cease-fire agreement and made a significant contribution to the 
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process of stopping the violence in the region. However, the composition, stationing and 
partial attitude of the Russian contingent also facilitated the process of legalization and 
strengthening of the administrative institutions and military capabilities of the illegal 
separatist government. These facts suggest, as Mihai Gribincea, a political annalist from 
Moldova, mentions, that “With the introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces, 
Transdniestrian separatist authorities achieved in peaceful manner what they failed to 
achieve during the armed conflict in the summer of 1992.”114 The status quo situation, 
created by the signing of this accord, perfectly suits Transdniestrian authorities as it 
entails no bloodshed, and at the same time, there is no need to offer concessions that 
affect their interests. Thus, the process of negotiation of a political settlement of the 
conflict during the last decade was permanently influenced by the Transdniestrian illegal 
authorities’ unwillingness to relinquish anything they believe was achieved by military 
means and their satisfaction with the status quo, created as a result of the cease fire and 
the introduction of the peacekeeping forces and Moldova’s attempts to regain lost 
grounds by promoting the policy of inclusion, a process discussed in the next section.   
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TWO DE FACTO INDEPENDENT STATES 
The peace-negotiation process between Moldova’s government and Tiraspol’s 
authorities in the post-conflict period hardly achieved any significant results. This section 
argues that in the last decade, the peace-resolution process did not advance very much. 
Despite the recognition of Moldova, including Transdniestria, as one state, these two 
regions developed into two de facto separate states, and, at the same time transforming 
the conflict into an politico-economic one, that mostly benefits the Transdniestrian elites. 
The Republic of Moldova took a democratic and free market oriented path of 
development and constantly promotes a course of inclusion with substantial autonomy for 
the Transdniestrian region, but preserving the unity of the state, because Moldova is not 
in the position to renounce 11 percent of its territory where 2/3 of its industrial potential 
is concentrated.  However, the economic and political situation, especially after the 
elections of the Communist majority in 2001, does not facilitate the creation of the 
necessary conditions to attract the support of Transdniestrian population toward 
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integration. In contrast, Transdniestria evolved into an authoritarian, Soviet-style enclave, 
with a command economy, which mostly benefits only the elites economically and 
socially. The Transdniestrian administration, the same as during the military 
confrontation, is satisfied with the created status quo and is in the position of maintaining 
the current situation.  
This subchapter concludes that the initial causes perceived by the Transdniestrian 
authorities for their secessionist demands are solved. However, during the last decade, 
conflict between the central Moldovan administration and Tiraspol authorities has 
evolved into an politico-economic one that serves the interests of the ruling elites mostly 
from the Transdniestrian region and the expansionist interests of RF. The Transdniestrian 
illegal administration, still composed of the same leadership that started the conflict, have 
built a de facto independent authoritarian state based on old Soviet ideology and 
encouraged by the attitudes of the external players, promotes a radical position toward the 
process of negotiations and demands independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the 
legal Moldovan Government. However, in contrast, Moldova underwent several changes 
in the administration and practically eliminated all the causes that triggered the conflict. 
However, it could not demonstrate the superiority of the democratic development, thus 
losing the population’s support. Under such conditions, the political solution to the 
conflict is difficult to achieve and might be possible only with the strong implication of 
the external actors.  
1. Moldova’s Position in the Process of Negotiation 
The political and economic development of the Republic of Moldova in the last 
decade is controversial. The conflict in the Transdniestrian region affects this controversy 
as well as the process of the final settlement of the conflict. 
This section argues that despite many political changes, in the post-conflict 
period, Moldova promoted a policy of inclusion, offering the Transdniestrian region 
significant autonomy, while preserving the integrity of the state, as stipulated in the July 
1992 “Convention regarding the principles of a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict 
in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova.” The main reason for 
maintaining the course of state integrity is the economic and geographic position of the 
Transdniestrian region and its importance for Moldovan development.  This section will 
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conclude that in the last decade, Moldova realized that it cannot deal with the problem the 
same way as during the conflict and changed its attitudes toward the Transdniestrian 
region, promoting a policy of inclusion, a democratic path of development and a free 
market economy. However, the difficulties in the political and economic development of 
Moldova, as well as the resistance of the Transdniestrian administration contributed to 
the stagnation of the negotiation process. In addition, the economic and political reforms 
in the RM did not facilitate the creation of the necessary conditions to attract the support 
of the Transdniestrian population toward integration, a condition strictly required for the 
final solution of this conflict. 
During the last decade, in order to find a plausible solution to the conflict on its 
territory, the Chisinau administration eliminated the causes that the Transdniestrian 
administration presumed triggered the conflict, such as changing the language law in 
1994, assuring its independent course of development, rather than integration in 
Romania, joining the CIS community, and agreeing to synchronize the withdrawal of 
Russian ammunition by offering Transdniestria an autonomous status. Second, Moldova 
has undergone significant changes in leadership, thus replacing the hardliners with more 
moderate leaders. Third, it offered the Transdniestrian region possibilities for economic 
development by providing it custom seals for external economic activities as part of the 
RM. Next, in 1997, Moldova accepted the notion of the “equality of parties” in the 
process of negotiations on the formation of a “common state.”115 Lastly, but not least, the 
Chisinau administration agreed to the federal construction of the future state. All these 
facts demonstrate Moldova’s intention to achieve a final solution to the Transdniestrian 
conflict through peaceful means. 
By 1994, all of the “causes” of the Transdniestrian conflict were mainly resolved. 
The Moldovan Constitution, adopted in July 1994, clearly stated the development of the 
independent state of the Republic of Moldova within its Post- Soviet borders and gave the 
Transdniestrian region the status of an autonomous region with large political, cultural, 
and economic privileges. In addition, the constitution stipulated Moldova’s course of 
development as a sovereign and independent state, thus eliminating the fears of 
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integration in Romania.  The orientation of the population in the western part of Moldova 
was also in the support of the independent course of development. One of the surveys 
conducted in 1992 showed that “less that 10 percent of ethnic Moldovan population 
supported union with Romania in the short or long term, and when given a choice 
between the ethnic tags “ Romanian” and “ Moldovan,” some 87 percent of Moldovan-
language speakers chose the later.”116 This situation has not changed since then.  
Furthermore, in April 1994, the Moldovan Parliament ratified the CIS 
membership, thus remaining under Russia’s sphere of influence. The language law was 
also changed and the language tests for state employees were suspended. Thus, after 
1994, the Republic of Moldova became a de facto bilingual state. Many students from the 
Transdniestrian region are currently studying in Chisinau and other cities on the right 
bank of the Dniester River. Finally, in1994, Moldova’s administration agreed to 
synchronize the evacuation of Russian ammunition and troops by offering Transdniestria 
an autonomous status, thus enhancing Transdniestrian security concerns. In that context, 
if the conflict was of ethnic origin, these changes should have ended the confrontations 
between the Transdniestrian and Moldovan administrations and facilitated the final 
political settlement of the conflict. However, this is not the case. 
In the immediate post-conflict period, most of the Moldovan pan-Romanian 
oriented politicians resigned and were replaced with more neutral politicians. For 
example, in July 1992, Andrei Sanghely was named Prime Minister and enjoyed 
substantial support from both ethnic-Moldovans as well as other minorities, including the 
Russians. Furthermore, since independence, the Republic of Moldova almost every year 
had major election, such as the presidential elections in 1991, parliamentary elections 
in1994, local elections in 1995, presidential elections in 1996, parliamentary elections in 
1998, local elections in 1998, presidential elections in 2000, parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2001, and local elections in 2002. This series of elections 
resulted in a complete change of the Moldovan leadership in existence since the 
beginning of the conflict. In addition, in the 2001 parliamentary elections, the Communist 
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party won the majority and was willing to take any steps necessary to solve the 
Transdniestrian conflict.  In April 2001, during his first official visit to Moscow, 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin stressed the readiness of ruling party even to 
change the constitution in order to solve the conflict. However, the only condition, he 
mentioned, was that the problem should be solved in the framework of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Moldova.117 These facts once again demonstrated Moldova’s 
readiness to negotiate the final settlement of the conflict, and created its necessary 
preconditions. 
In order to facilitate the economic development of the Transdniestrian region and 
thus, move forward, the process of negotiations, Moldova’s authorities offered 
Transdniestria the possibility of external economic activities as part of the RM. Thus, in 
1997, the Chisinau authorities offered custom seals for external economic activities in 
hope that the Transdniestrian administration will be more flexible in the process of 
negotiation. However, this action did not change Tiraspol’s position, and as a result, in 
2002, Moldova changed custom seals and implemented more actions, directed toward the 
limitations of the economic possibilities of Transdniestrian enterprises. However, the fact 
that the Moldovan government offered its customs seals demonstrates, once again, its 
positive attitude toward the process of negotiations and its willingness to offer 
Transdniestria considerable autonomy.  
In 1997, Moldova took one more step in assuring its readiness to negotiate and to 
solve the conflict in the shortest possible terms, but at the same time, provided more 
grounds for resistance to the process of the Transdniestrian administration. 
“Memorandum on the settlement of the conflict,” which was endorsed by the 
Transdniestrian illegal authorities and Moldovan administration with the assistance of the 
OSCE in July 1996, introduced the new pattern of relationships between the conflicting 
parties. The memorandum stated that the parties would “continue the establishment 
between them of “state-legal relations,” statement interpreted by TMR as establishing 
state-to-state relations. However, the provision that the parties would “build their 
relations in the framework of a “common state” caused more controversies.  Former 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Evgenii Primakov, defines the 
notion of a “common state as a “form of federation with different levels of independence 
for its constituent parts, and a different scale of delegation of authorities to the 
Center.”118  Transdniestrian authorities interpreted that statement to be an equal 
partnership between the two states. First, the Moldovan government rejected that 
document, but in May 1997, the newly elected President, Petru Lucinschii, signed the 
Memorandum with an added annex that explained all the stipulations. The 
Transdniestrian authorities never acknowledged this annex.119  Thus, Moldova accepted 
the notion of the “equality of parties” in the process of negotiations on the formation of a 
“common state,” a fact that once again weakened the Moldovan position but created 
insights for the Transdniestrian administration to maintain their position in the 
negotiations.  
One more argument in favor of Moldova’s position of inclusion is the 
endorsement by the Chisinau administration of the federal concept of a future state. 
During the last decade, Moldova was in position to offer Transdniestria significant 
political, economic, and cultural autonomy, but in the framework of a unitary state. 
Considering that the Transdniestrian region is de facto an independent state, “granting 
substantial autonomy to Transdniestria without giving it an incentive to participate in 
politics at the center would ensure continued separation.”120 Thus, after 2002, Moldova 
endorsed OSCE’s idea of a settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict through the 
federalization of the Republic, thus offering Transdniestria even more possibilities for 
self-control. However, Moldova is promoting a plan of an asymmetrical federation, 
where Transdniestria will, to some extent, depend on the center, a position not shared by 
the Tiraspol administration.  
All the aforementioned facts demonstrate Moldova’s position of inclusion of the 
Transdniestrian region versus its separation. They demonstrate that the presumed causes 
of the Transdniestrian conflict were solved long ago, thus creating the necessary 
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conditions for a political solution to the Transdniestrian conflict. However, the political 
and economic development of the Republic of Moldova during the last decade failed to 
demonstrate the superiority of the democratic system and free market economy over the 
centralized authoritarian type of development of Transdniestria, which significantly 
affected Moldova’s ability to attract the Transdniestrian population to integration instead 
of separation. 
However, the question remains, why did Moldova tries so hard to reintegrate the 
Transdniestrian region? The answer is the geographic and economic importance of that 
region for  Moldova’s development. The Republic of Moldova is under the Russian 
economic sphere of influence. Most of Moldova’s exports and imports are going to and 
from the Russian Federation. All roads, gas pipelines, and most of the electricity lines 
connecting Moldova with the rest of the CIS countries, pass through Transdniestrian 
region. Furthermore, if the Republic of Moldova pursues the policy of integration in the 
EU, it must develop its infrastructure, an impossible process without the implication of 
the Transdniestrian region. In addition, the western part of Moldova is mostly agrarian, 
while the Transdniestrian region is highly industrialized as 2/3 of Moldova’s industrial 
potential is concentrated in that region. As shown in Table 2, most of the industrial 
products of Moldova in 1991 were manufactured in the Transdniestrian region.  
 
Table 2 Transdniestria in the Moldovan Economy, 1991:Regional production as a 
percentage of the national total (From Charles King)121 
 
Large electrical machines 100.0 % 
Power transformers 100.0  
Gas containers 100.0 
Cotton textiles 96.6 
Electric energy 87.5 
Cement 58.1 
Low- horsepower electric engines 55.8 
Sheet metal 23.5 
Agricultural products 13.1 
 
The aforementioned facts demonstrate the vital significance of the Transdniestrian 
region for the economic development of the Republic of Moldova. This fact also is 
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understood by the Tiraspol administration and Moscow, and is played against Moldova. 
Thus, taking into consideration these actions implemented by Moldova’s administration 
and the economic significance of the Transdniestrian region for Moldova, it is possible to 
conclude that over time the conflict had gained a more politico-economic aspect. 
As mentioned previously, during the last decade, Moldova underwent many 
political changes. Thus, most of the acute economic and political problems were 
unaddressed, since many political leaders would not risk their political lives by 
implementing those reforms. As a result, Moldova now is the poorest country in Europe, 
Albania having overtaken it in 2000. The Republic of Moldova also has the only 
Communist government left in Europe. The democratic opposition is dispersed and 
disunited. The Republic of Moldova in 2003 was rated by the Freedom House 
organization as a “partly free” country with an overall tendency for political rights to 
decline.122 Moldova is also one of the most corrupt countries in the world.123 In 2001, 
34.9 percent of the Transdniestrian population considered itself first and foremost, 
citizens of Transdniestria, 13.9 percent inhabitants of their locality, and only 4.4 percent 
citizens of Moldova.124 The conclusion drawn is that population of the Transdniestrian 
region does not have insight into reuniting with Moldova, a factor that demonstrates that 
Moldova failed to attract the sympathy of the Transdniestrian inhabitants, which plays a 
significant role in the peacebuilding process.   
Moldova’s discontinuity in its political orientation is another cause contributing to 
the deadlock of the negotiation process. As mentioned previously, the Republic of 
Moldova is a member of the CIS, and, moreover, the Communist administration 
promotes the idea of joining the Russia-Belarus Union. Over time, the Communist 
majority of the Moldovan government also signaled their intention for European 
integration, declaring that integration in the European community is of vital interest to the 
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republic.125 These two different orientations create confusion over the intent for the 
future development of Moldova. As Adrian Nastase, Romanian Prime-Minister 
characterized this situation: “The situation in Chisinau is very difficult, because, besides 
Transdniestrian problem there is a problem of political identity and an internal battle 
between political forces over the future orientation of the Republic of Moldova.”126 Thus, 
Moldovan foreign policy lacks continuity in its political and economic orientation. The 
Transdniestrian administration uses these facts, which from the beginning, was oriented 




Figure 2.   “Moldova’s Dilemma” (From A. Dimitrov)127 
 
In summary, in the past decade, the Chisinau administration, understanding the 
significance of the Transdniestrian region for the development of Moldova, took many 
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steps to negotiate a political resolution to the conflict, and agreed to synchronize the 
Russian ammunition withdrawal by offering Transdniestria autonomous status in 1994, 
changed the language law in 1994, offered Transdniestria custom seals for external 
economic activities as part of the RM in 1996, in 1997, accepted the notion of the 
“equality of parties” in the process of negotiations on the formation of a “common 
state,”128 and agreed to the federal construction of the future state. However, the political 
and economic failure of Moldova’s development does not provide a good example of the 
superiority of democratic development for the Transdniestrian population, which resulted 
in the failure to attract the sympathy of the Transdniestrian population toward integration. 
In addition, the Transdniestrian authorities were unwilling to cooperate. Thus, despite 
political instability in the Republic of Moldova after independence, overall, the policy 
toward the peaceful solution of the Transdniestrian conflict was constantly inclusive and 
directed at granting a high level of autonomy to Transdniestria within the borders of the 
integral Republic of Moldova. Contrarily, Transdniestrian policy represents the opposite 
case.   
2. Consolidation of Transdniestrian Statehood 
In order to achieve a political solution to any conflict, both parties should be 
willing to cooperate and make compromises, which will benefit both parties in the 
dispute and eliminate the zero sum game of the confrontation.  This section argues that in 
contrast to Moldova’s position in the process of negotiation, Transdniestrian authorities 
are not cooperative and are satisfied with the current status quo situation. Over time, the 
Transdniestrian elites consolidated political and economical power and developed 
economic interests in preserving the conflict. Thus, even if the starting causes of the 
conflict were eliminated long ago, Tiraspol authorities are unwilling to renounce anything 
they believe was achieved by military means.  In addition, they still promote the image of 
the Moldovan government as an aggressor, thus maintaining the suspicion of the 
Transdniestrian population toward the intents of Moldova, a fact that also serves the 
interests of preserving the conflict. 
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This section will conclude that, during the last decade, the Transdniestrian illegal 
administration, still composed of the same leadership that started the conflict, have built a 
de facto independent authoritarian state based on old Soviet ideology and developed 
economic and social interests in preserving the conflict. The status quo situation, created 
around this conflict, perfectly suits the aforementioned interests, thus encouraging them 
to promote a radical position toward the process of negotiations and to demand anything 
but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the legal Moldovan Government.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the introduction of peacekeeping forces 
instead of facilitating the achievement of a political settlement of conflict, created the 
necessary conditions for the Transdniestrian authorities to strengthen existing institutions 
and to build new ones, which encourage the Tiraspol administration to resist the final 
settlement of the conflict. This process was accomplished de facto by September 1994, 
when the Tiraspol administration announced the introduction of TMR proper currency.129 
However, the accomplishment of the last step of state building resulted when 
Transdniestria adopted its constitution on December 24, 1995.  By this time, the 
unrecognized Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic had all the attributes of an independent 
state since it exercised total control over its territory, had established legislative, 
executive and judiciary branches of government, created a national bank and introduced 
its own currency, developed an armed forces and police units, introduced customs and 
border troops, and established state symbols. TMR only locked the seat in the UNO. 
Furthermore, as Vitaly Kulik argues, by 2002 “compared to Transdniestria, the process of 
state construction is significantly slowed down in Moldova, related to the change of state 
administration.”130 Under such conditions, the status quo became a desirable alternative 
to serious negotiation. Thus, it is not surprising that the negotiation processes is so slow, 
and practically to date, did not produce any significant political results.   
In contrast to Moldovan development, since the military confrontation in 1992, 
the Transdniestrian leadership did not suffer any significant changes. The same leaders 
that mobilized the population for military confrontations in order to maintain their 
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political and economic status after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, for the last decade, 
are in the position of power and of negotiating a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In 
addition, TMR did not embrace the democratic changes and the free market economy. 
For the last decade, political freedoms have been suppressed and there is only one 
significant party. Free press and the freedom of speech are absent in the region. As 
Charles King mentions: “Visitors frequently characterized DMR (TMR) as living 
museum, were public murals and placards still praised the achievements of the Soviet 
Union and urged the workers of the world to unite.”131  
Transdniestria’s economic system is still based on the Soviet type model. 
However, the entrepreneurial activities are mostly concentrated in the hands of Smirnov 
and his allies. Transdniestria also became a haven for weapons smuggling and illegal 
entrepreneurs.  As Hryhory Perepelitsa, from Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic 
Studies argues, “In conditions when Chisinau has the legal right to supervise legal export 
of production from Transdniestria, smuggling in this republic became state business.”132 
As many analysts demonstrate, the two sons of Igor Smirnov are in charge of that 
process. In addition, Transdniestrian leadership did not implement the process of 
privatization of the state enterprises, but managed to preserve and even to improve the 
existing economic-industrial complex of the TMR, thus increasing their possibility to 
extract resources for state building. As a result, since 1996, the GDP per capita in 
Transdniestria was always 1.5-2 times higher than in Moldova.133 However, the living 
conditions of the population are even worse than in the rest of Moldova and the state debt 
to Russia is almost two times larger than the debt of Moldova. These facts suggest that 
Transdniestrian authorities are extracting economic benefits mostly for themselves and 
the current situation of the conflict is benefiting the Transdniestrian elites. Thus, the 
conflict changed its aspect and became more a politico-economic dispute. 
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In addition, in order to preserve their power, the Transdniestrian authorities are 
not only building the state institutions but are also creating Transdniestria’s own 
identity.134 Furthermore, until now, Transdniestrian propaganda (ideological education) 
is oriented toward the creation of a Moldovan image as aggressors and even fascists. The 
Transdniestrian administration is suppressing central Moldovan channels and newspapers 
by any means possible, as well creating unfavorable conditions for schooling in 
Romanian. Thus, it is possible to conclude that Tiraspol authorities are interested in the 
maintenance of tensions between the Transdniestrian and Moldovan population, a fact 
that permits them to manipulate their population much easier.  
The Transdniestrian government sees the presence of the Russian militaries as 
vital to their security. In 1994, when the Russian and Moldovan Presidents agreed to a 
three-year timeframe for the unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops and 
ammunitions from the territory of Moldova, the Transdniestrian authorities protested that 
decision and nationalized all the military arsenals of the Fourteenth Russian Army.135 
The Transdniestrian authorities also asserted pressure on the Russian Federation to 
withdraw from the 1999 Istanbul commitments, where Russia agreed to withdraw its 
military arsenal and personnel from the Republic of Moldova by 2002. The author 
believes that this result from the benefits they receive from the partial attitude of the 
Russian peacekeeping contingent. In the opinion of the Transdniestrian administration, 
the introduction of a multinational contingent with the participation of the EU would only 
escalate the conflict. In that contest, as mentioned previously, Moldovan statements about 
European integration are creating the necessary foundation for Transdniestrian resistance 
to the unification process. 
In summary, the Convention signed in July 1992, despite its contribution to the 
normalization of the situation on the Dniester River, overall, did not facilitate the final 
solution of the conflict. The Republic of Moldova accepted the only solution available at 
the time because of Russian interference in the peace settlement process and 
                                                 
134 In 1991, most of the Transdniestrian population considered themselves citizens of the Soviet 
Union. In 2001, 34.9 percent of the Transdniestrian population considered themselves first and foremost 
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unwillingness of the international community to challenge Russian dominance. The 
ceasefire agreement and introduction of the peacekeeping forces in the Republic of 
Moldova did not solve the conflict, but contributed to the creation of a status quo 
situation, that benefited Transdniestrian development as an independent state and as a 
result, negatively influenced the negotiating process. The Transdniestrian illegal 
administration, still composed of the same leadership that started the conflict, has built a 
de facto independent authoritarian state based on old Soviet ideology and developed 
economic and social interests in preserving the conflict. The status quo situation, created 
around this conflict, perfectly suits the aforementioned interests, thus encouraging them 
to promote a radical position toward the process of negotiations and to demand anything 
but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by the legal Moldovan Government. In 
contrast, Moldova underwent several changes in administration, and practically 
eliminated all the causes that triggered the conflict, but however, could not demonstrate 
the superiority of the democratic development, thus losing the support of the population. 
Thus, over time, the Transdniestrian conflict evolved into a politico-economic 
confrontation between the elites of both sides. Under such conditions, a political solution 
to the conflict is difficult to achieve. As a result of the failure of the locally driven 
conflict-resolution process, international involvement becomes even more important and 
is the only path to follow. 
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IV. POST- CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: POSITIONS AND 
INTEREST OF EXTERNAL ACTORS 
Only the local actors are capable of creating the institutions and inclusive 
habits of governance that inhibit civil wars. But it is external parties that 
typically have the capacity to shape, directly or indirectly, the environment 
in which these dramas play out and - once a conflict spiral has begun - to 
influence the options available and the choices made by local actors.136 
Chester Crocker 
Most International interventions since the end of the Cold War were not 
driven by the material interests of the outside powers but by their moral 
interests: securing peace and Justice. Peace and justice, however, are not 
natural allies, unless right just happens to coincide with might.137 
Richard Betts 
When outside parties do not agree in their analyses of a conflict or what 
should be done to move a peace process forward, the effect can all too 
easily be to confuse the parties or, worse, encourage them to engage in 




In the post Soviet era, external players, although they did not create the conflicts, 
have played a major role in the course and resolution of conflicts.139 In that context, 
Chapter IV analyses the process of post conflict resolution, stressing the positions and 
interests of external actors: the Russian Federation (RF), Ukraine, Romania, the United 
States (US), the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), and the 
European Union (EU). 
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From the very beginning of the conflict, all of the aforementioned countries and 
organizations generally support Moldova’s territorial integrity and peaceful solution of 
the conflict. Transdniestrian independence is not officially recognized by any of the 
previously mentioned actors, and secession as a solution to this conflict is strongly 
opposed by all, including the conflict actors. However, their personal interests dictate the 
level of involvement of those actors and their commitment to the peace process, which 
explains why international actors do not agree on the methods for resolving this conflict. 
Disagreement between international mediators and guarantors on the methods of a 
solution to the Transdniestrian conflict is also one of the reasons why it is currently 
impossible to solve this conflict and might be prolonged for many years in the future.  
In that context, this chapter argues that the permanent deadlock in the process of 
the negotiations of the Transdniestrian conflict is not only the result of disagreements 
between internal actors, but also is caused by the attitudes and interests of the external 
players. The author argues that the Russian Federation is interested in maintaining the 
conflict as it is, or its solution should provide maintenance of Moldova under the Russian 
sphere of influence, thus Russians view the presence of military forces in the region as a 
tool of exercising that influence. Ukraine is becoming an important player, because it is 
one of the guarantors of the negotiation process. Taking into consideration its orientation 
toward Russia, the author argues that the Ukrainian role in the negotiation process is 
subordinated to Russian interests. Romania was a very active supporter of independence 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. However, in 1992, it was excluded 
from the negotiation process. The author argues that, in the last decade, Romania 
concentrated its efforts in the direction of integration in NATO and EU. That fact, as well 
as the hostile attitude of Chisinau after the election of the Communist majority in 2001, 
determines Romania’s lack of involvement in the negotiation process.  
Accordingly, the Republic of Moldova is not one of the main areas of interest of 
the western powers, thus limiting their implication in the conflict only indirectly through 
the OSCE and at the same time, trying not to disrupt their relations with Russia.  
However, the biggest concern of the United States and EU is the presence of a large 
arsenal of Russian weapons and ammunitions in the Transdniestrian region and its great 
potential of being smuggled to terrorist organizations and into the areas of conflict around 
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the world. Both the United States and EU hold firm on this issue: Russia must to 
withdraw or destroy its military arsenal in Moldova and Russian troops must leave that 
neutral country.  The OSCE is the main representative of Western interests in the process 
of negotiations. However, because of its weaknesses and Russian influence in the 
organization, it is not effective in promoting the peace process. However, if strongly 
supported by the western powers and organizations, in the future, it might be a decisive 
player in that process.  With the latest expansion of NATO and future expansion of the 
European Union, the Western powers as well as the Russian Federation have increased 
their concerns about the status of Russian troops in the Transdniestrian region and the 
status of the Transdniestrian conflict. This fact will contribute to the intensification of the 
negotiation process and changes in attitudes of many external players toward this 
conflict.  
A. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS INTERESTS 
The Russian Federation was always interested in that region. As argued in 
Chapter II, since 1812, Moldova was under the control of Russia. Thus, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Russia follows a course that maintained their influence in the post 
Soviet regions.  Taking into account Russia’s weakness compared with the West, it is 
forced to cooperate with western organizations such as NATO and EU. However, 
concerning the CIS countries, including Moldova, Russia supports the process of 
maintenance of stability in the former European post-Soviet space, but based on 
exclusive Russian political, economic and military domination. 
This subchapter argues that Russia’s position in the process of negotiation is 
based on its interests in dominating the region. It views Transdniestria as a “key” to 
maintaining Moldova under its influence. However, despite evident support for the 
secessionist authorities, the Russian Federation did not recognize Transdniestria 
Moldovan Republic as independent, but was in favor of a special status for TMR in the 
integral Republic of Moldova and does not support the option of partition as method of 
resolving this conflict.140 Thus, by supporting the Transdniestrian authorities, Russia 
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encourages the status quo situation, and at the same time, assures control over the 
political and economic development of Moldova. The status quo situation gives Russia 
legitimacy in maintaining a military presence in the region, a factor, combined with the 
expansion of NATO and EU, becomes much more important not only for Moldova’s-
Russia relations, but also on the international level. Thus, the final settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict is not in the interests of the Russian Federation. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, RF developed an economic interest in the 
RM. The economical development of the Republic of Moldova during the last decade is 
mainly oriented toward Russian markets and dependent on RF imports, especially energy. 
In the period from 1993 to 2003, Russia has the lead in investing in the statutory capital 
of Moldovan enterprises.141 Moldova’s dependency on Russian energy is evident. Over a 
half of Moldova’s energy resources are imported from Russia. “Gazprom,” the Russian 
Oil Company, has a controlling share in the Moldovan energy company “Moldova-
GAZ.”  Out of more than a billion USD of foreign debt, more than half the debt is to 
“Gazprom.”142 The Transdniestrian region is almost in the same situation. Thus, the 
economic development of Moldova in the last decade created a situation of dependency 
on the RF and ensured a place for Moldova in the Russian economic sphere of influence. 
In addition, the economic domination of the Russian Federation over the 
Moldovan economy creates favorable conditions for exercising influence over the 
political decisions of the Moldovan Government. During the military confrontation 
between Moldova’s central government and the Transdniestrian authorities in 1992, 
Russia, in order to soften Moldova’s position, imposed an economic blockade. Since 
then, whenever Moldova tries to implement policies contrary to the Russian interests, 
Russia threatens Moldova by raising oil and gas prices or with disconnection from energy 
resources and thus creating a dependency situation on Moscow for Moldova’s political 
development.  
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The constitution of the Republic of Moldova asserts that it is a neutral state. In 
that context, the presence of foreign militaries on its soil is prohibited. However, until 
now, Russia still has large quantities of ammunitions and military equipment in the 
Transdniestrian region of Moldova. In addition to the peacekeeping forces, Russia also 
has an insignificant number of military personnel, who are responsible for protecting 
military storages. Therefore, the RM, with the support of the international community, 
permanently declares the need to withdraw completely the Russian military presence 
from the region. Thus, in August 1994, the Russian and Moldovan Presidents agreed to a 
three-year period for the complete withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army. The treaty signed 
by the prime-ministers of aforementioned countries with the participation of the 
representatives from TMR, acknowledged the temporal status of the Russian troops.143 
Soon afterwards, the Russian president, challenged by the militaries and ultranationalists 
from the Duma, “began backing away from the 1994 agreement,” but by May 1995, the 
Fourteenth Army has been downsized to a division and renamed the “Operational Group 
of Russian Forces.”144   
However, as Boris Parakhonsky from the Ukrainian National Institute of Strategic 
studies mentions, “The maintenance of the military presence in the Transdniestrian 
conflict zone is viewed by Russia as a sort of pressure leverage not only in the process of 
peaceful settlement, but also in the internal process in Moldova, in its foreign policy and 
in general development of the political and economic situation beyond Russia’s 
borders.”145  Under pressure from the international community, the RF in November 
1999, during the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, agreed to withdraw their military presence in 
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Moldova until the end of 2002.146 However, in the fall of 2002, RF declared that it cannot 
respect the assumed obligations, because of the uncooperative attitude of the 
Transdniestrian administration. At the ministerial OSCE Meeting in Porto, the terms of 
Russian withdrawal were extended until December 31, 2003. By the end of 2003, the RF 
once again did not fulfill its obligations. This time the RF made it clear that it does not 
have any intention to withdraw unconditionally its military presence from the region and 
it does not accept any terms. Additionally, by this time, the RF, instead of withdrawing 
from the region illegally transferred large quantities of heavy weapons, ammunitions as 
well as personnel to the Transdniestrian Armed Forces, de facto building a loyal 
Army.147 The aforementioned facts demonstrate that the RF prefers the current status quo 
situation over the final solution, which would not satisfy their military, political and 
economic interests. 
With the expansion of NATO in April 2004 to include Romania as a full member 
of the organization, and the planned enlargement of the EU in 2007, thinking in realist 
terms, the new frontier between the West and East would be the frontier of Moldova and 
Romania. Under such conditions, the presence of Russian troops in Moldova enhances 
the strategic meaning for Russian security, at the same time, raising concerns of the 
western organizations. Thus, the aforementioned facts, once again demonstrate that 
Russia’s position on the Transdniestrian conflict will still be directed by the possibility of 
maintaining its military presence in the region, a fact that cannot be accepted by the RM 
and the international community.  
Taking into account the aforementioned interests of the Russian Federation, 
despite official Russian support for Chisinau, at the same time, encourages the 
Transdniestrian leaders to maintain their uncooperative attitude toward the process of 
negotiations, thus preserving their influence and military presence in the region. In that 
context, after the cease-fire agreement, achieved in 1992, Russia equipped and trained the 
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military forces of TMR,148 provided financial and technical support, and encouraged its 
leadership to pursue secessionist policies.149 Recently, on May 17 2004, the Deputy 
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Vladimir Isacov, responsible for the 
evacuation of the military arsenal from Moldova, visited the Republic of Moldova, 
without even informing the Chisinau authorities of the purpose of his visit.150 These facts 
demonstrate Russian interests in preserving the current status of the conflict and their 
support of the Transdniestrian administration. 
In summary, Russian involvement in the process of negotiation is driven not by 
the intent of promoting justice and peace, but by the personal interests of maintaining 
politico-economical control over the region. Therefore, the status of the Russian troops in 
the Republic of Moldova is a very important politico-economic tool in achieving Russian 
goals. In addition, with the latest expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
Russian military presence in the Transdniestrian region is not only a significant factor of 
Russian politico-economic interests but also an important security factor. Thus, the final 
solution to the Transdniestrian conflict does not serve Russian interests since it eliminates 
the need to maintain its military presence in the region.  Accordingly, the presence of the 
Russian military contingent in the region is the cornerstone for Russian acceptance of any 
solution to the conflict. Under such conditions, the attitudes of Ukraine and Romania 
toward the conflict in Moldova and their relations with Russia are significantly important.  
B. ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS OF THE NEIGHBORING STATES OF 
UKRAINE AND ROMANIA  
Romania and Ukraine are two neighbors of the Republic of Moldova and very 
important strategic partners. Since the very beginning of the Transdniestrian conflict, 
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both countries were involved in the negotiation process. The first attempts to stop the 
violence on the Dniester River were made in the quadripartite forum of Russia, Ukraine, 
Romania, and the Republic of Moldova. However, after the July 1992 cease-fire 
agreement between Russia and the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania were 
practically excluded from the negotiations. However, Ukraine was again invited to 
participate as a guarantor of negotiations in 1995, while Romania still only influences the 
conflict indirectly through international organizations.  
1. Ukrainian Position and Perspectives 
Ukraine, as a neighbor of Moldova has security, economic and ethnic ties with the 
latter. Ukrainians in the Republic of Moldova are the second largest minority comprising 
13.8 percent of the total population. Their representation in the Transdniestrian region is 
even higher (28.3 percent), thus increasing the role of Ukraine in the socio-economic and 
political development of both Moldova and Transdniestria. As a result, the idea of uniting 
Transdniestria to Ukraine becomes increasingly popular among Transdniestrian 
Ukrainians.151 The aforementioned factor also was one of the causes why, in 1995, both 
conflicting parties invited Ukraine to participate in the peace process and it became one 
of the guarantors of the negotiations. In addition, there were some proposals for replacing 
the Moldovan and Transdniestrian contingency of the peacekeeping forces with one from 
Ukraine. 
In addition, economic exchanges between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine 
are permanently increasing. In 1996, Ukraine signed a free trade agreement with 
Moldova, a factor that stipulated the economic exchange between these two countries. In 
2000, the amount of foreign trade turnover between Ukraine and Moldova (including 
Transdniestria) increased by 43.4 percent in 1999 and placed Moldova second after 
Russia regarding the export of Ukrainian goods. In addition, many large enterprises from 
both parts of Moldova maintain close economic relations with firms from Ukraine.152 
However, this economic exchange might be even greater, if the conflict between  
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Transdniestria and Moldova would be resolved. In such a situation, Ukraine is interested 
in a peaceful settlement to the Transdniestrian conflict, which might resolve the customs 
issues and increase the flow of goods.  
At the same time, Ukraine has security concerns over the contraband passing 
through the country from the Transdniestrian region, thus negatively influencing its 
economy as well as increasing the criminal climate in Ukraine. In 2001, one third of the 
confiscated firearms in Ukraine originated in the Transdniestrian region and 83 percent of 
the total volume of narcotic row material apprehended by the Ukrainian customs and 
border troops occurred at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border on the Transdniestrian 
controlled sector.153 In addition, of the annually 1 million tons of mineral oil used by 
Moldova, almost half is imported illegally through Ukraine and Transdniestrian 
territories, thus neither Ukraine nor Moldova benefit from the taxation of these products. 
Thus, these interests of national security are also influencing Ukrainian position in the 
negotiations. 
However, Ukraine places a much higher priority on its relations with Russia than 
with Moldova.154  Under such conditions, Ukrainian administration has the tendency to 
support the Russian course of a political settlement of the conflict, and as a result, will 
also take a favorable attitude toward Transdniestria, indicating that Ukraine is losing its 
capabilities as an independent guarantor of the conflict-regulating process, thus making 
Russia the most powerful player in that process. 
2. Romanian Position and Perspectives 
As discussed in Chapter II, Romania has tight historical relations with the 
Republic of Moldova.155 Taking into consideration the historical development, traditions, 
demography of the population, national values, and language, the Republic of Moldova 
might be considered a second Romanian state, thus a more direct implication of Romania 
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in the process of a political settlement of this conflict is expected.156 However, Romania 
in the last decade, directed its policy toward integration into NATO and EU, and 
involvement in the conflict did not benefit these aspirations of the Bucharest 
administration, thus determining its policy of influencing the process of negotiations only 
indirectly through the international and regional organizations. 
In 1991, when the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence, Romania 
was the first country to recognize its independence. It also made many appeals at the 
international level in favor of international recognition of the new establish country. At 
the same time, Romania was actively involved in the process of initiating negotiations 
over the cease-fire agreement between the Transdniestrian authorities and Moldovan 
political elites. Romania was also one of the countries ready to send peacekeeping forces 
to stop the violence. However, at the same time, it was viewed by the Transdniestrian 
administration as a potential aggressor. As a result, the same as Ukraine, after the July 
1992 Peace Accord, Romania was excluded from the negotiation process.157 Thus, since 
1992, Romania participates actively in the cultural development of Moldova, but does 
influence directly neither the political development, nor the process of the final 
settlement of the conflict. 
There are two main reasons for such an attitude on the part of the Romanian 
administration. First, the Bucharest administration is pursuing the course of integration in 
NATO and EU and second, Moldova’s administration does not want closer political 
support from Romania. 
After 1992, the relationship between the Romanian and Moldovan governments 
range from very warm to the point of almost interrupting the state of affairs. 
Traditionally, the governments had a very good relationship, especially in the economic 
sphere, education and culture, health protection, and protection of common historical 
places. To show the special status of the relationship between those two countries, in 
2000, the Presidents of Moldova and Romania decorated each other with the highest 
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distinctions of their states.158 These relations deteriorated dramatically with the election 
of the Communist majority in the Moldovan Parliament. In 2002, Moldovan authorities 
accused Romania of interference in its internal affairs and declared some Romanian 
diplomats persona non grata.159 In response, Bucharest denied all the accusations and 
reaffirmed their willingness to cooperate. However, they also accused Moldovan 
Communist authorities of violating human rights and liberties, and stopping the logical 
development of the country toward democracy and rule of law, and expelled one of the 
Moldovan diplomats.160 This conflict escalated to the point that the Counsel of Europe 
had to discuss it.161 Thus, despite the similar origins of the Romanians and Moldovans, 
their relations in the political sphere are instable and are mostly hostile to each other, 
triggered by the attitudes of the Russia oriented Communist majority, which came to 
Moldova because of 1992 Parliamentary elections.  
The second explanation of Romania’s attitude toward the RM and the conflict in 
the Transdniestrian region is its political course of development. In the last decade, 
Romania directed its foreign policy more toward NATO and EU integration. As a result, 
in April 2004, Romania was accepted as a full member in NATO and is scheduled to join 
the European Union in 2007. In order to be accepted into the EU, Romania must meet 
some criteria and undergo some changes in its political and economic development. In 
order to meet these criteria, Romania does not promote an aggressive policy of 
integration with Moldova, a fact feared by the Transdniestrian population. It builds its 
relations with Moldova mostly in accordance with its course of integration into the EU.   
However, in the future, Romania might play a more significant role in the 
development of both the RM and the peace settlement process. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the RM declared European integration its strategic goal. In the case of a 
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serious orientation of the Republic of Moldova toward the European Union, Romania 
would be the connecting bridge, at the same time, if not thinking in realist terms, the new 
frontier between the West and East would be the frontier of Moldova and Romania. Thus, 
Romanian policy would be directed not only by its own interests and aspirations, but also 
by the interests of NATO and the European Union, organizations that until now, had 
minor involvement in the solution of this conflict. 
In summary, Ukraine is becoming an important player in Russian interests, at the 
same time, preserving its economic interests. Due to its economic and security interest as 
well as trust from both parties in the conflict, Ukraine can be involved even more in the 
process of negotiation as well as peacekeeping operations in the region. However, the 
introduction of Ukrainian peacekeepers will not significantly change the situation, 
because of the political orientation of Ukraine toward Russia, thus supporting its course 
of settlement of this conflict.  Romanian foreign policy is directed toward integration 
with the European Union and NATO, thus their attitudes toward the settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict is directed by these aspirations. In addition, neither Moldova nor 
Transdniestria wants Romania’s involvement in the process of negotiations. However, 
with the acceptance of Romania in NATO and the EU, it can play a significant role in the 
process, but again indirectly only through these organizations.  
C. THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THEIR 
INTERESTS 
This subchapter argues that the U.S. interests in the Transdniestrian conflict are 
mostly related to the establishment of effective control over the large Russian military 
arsenal, concentrated on the left bank of the Dniester River and the withdrawal of the 
Russian military presence from the region, thus diminishing Russian military dominance 
over Moldova. The author also argues that EU involvement in the solution of the 
Transdniestrian conflict mainly derives from security concerns, and will increase with the 
expansion of the Union to include Romania.  
1. The United States and its Perspectives 
U.S. interest in the Transdniestrian conflict is primarily related to the presence of 
the Russian arsenal in the region. After the terrorists attack on the United States on 
September 11, 2001, the Bush administration increased its interest and involvement in the 
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former Soviet regions directly related to the war on terrorism and countries of the “axis of 
evil”. Thus, with the conflict in Balkans and involvement in the building of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the United Stats is not very interested in the development of the 
Transdniestrian conflict. Nevertheless, because of the large quantity of ammunitions in 
the Transdniestrian region, with the real potential of being smuggled to support terrorist 
organizations, the United States would still be involved in the solution of the 
Transdniestrian conflict, only indirectly through OSCE, and may change its attitudes if 
evidence of the supply of weapons from Transdniestria to the terrorist organizations 
surfaced. 
The United States recognized the Republic of Moldova on December 26, 1991 
only after Russian recognition. Since the United States contributed significantly to the 
politico-economic development of Moldova, the former is the second investor in 
Moldova’s enterprises after the Russian Federation.162 In the political sphere, the United 
States supports the liberal values of the democratic development, development of a civil 
society and Moldovan inspirations toward European integration.163 However, all these 
actions are nothing more than what the U.S. government is doing worldwide. 
The region was never one of the priority regions on the U.S.’s administration list, 
and its interest in resolving the Transdniestrian conflict mostly results from the presence 
of the Fourteenth Russian Army in the region and from the large quantity of 
ammunition.164 As mentioned in previous chapters, the Russian Federation has more than 
30,000 tons of ammunition and a large number of military equipment in the 
Transdniestrian region. These ammunitions and weapons are constantly smuggled into 
conflict territories and could possibly end up in the hands of terrorist organizations. In 
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that context, the United States supported the OSCE Istanbul and Porto resolutions that 
stipulated the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian troops and ammunitions from the 
Transdniestrian region, and was willing to provide extensive technical and financial 
support for the transportation and destruction of the afore mentioned arsenal.165  
In addition, the United States actively supported the OSCE plan of the 
federalization of the Republic of Moldova as a real possible solution to the 
Transdniestrian conflict and to the final withdrawal of the Russian military presence from 
the region. Thus, in a declaration made in September 2003 by Douglas Davidson, the 
vice-chief of the American mission to the OSCE in Vienna, he mentioned that the United 
States and EU pay attention to the Transdniestrian conflict and will continue to make a 
real contribution to the peaceful resolution of that dispute.166 The U.S. and EU reaction to 
the Russian plan of federalization, developed unilaterally in November 2003, evidence 
their intentions. The goal of that plan was to transform the Republic of Moldova into a 
Russian protectorate and guarantee the presence of the Russian military in the region for 
at least 30 more years. Both administrations supported the OSCE critical position toward 
the plan, which contributed to the Moldovan administration’s rejection of that plan at the 
last moment.167 
In summary, the U.S. support of the political and economic development of 
Moldova is significant. However, Transdniestrian conflict interests is only in the context 
of establishing control over the weapons proliferation from the military arsenal in TMR 
and of minimizing Russian military dominance over the region.  
2.  The European Union and Its Perspectives 
In the last decade, the European Union built its relationship with the Republic of 
Moldova in a framework of support for the democratic development and transition to a 
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market economy. Its involvement in the Transdniestrian conflict was insignificant and is 
mainly based on security concerns. Due to its controversial policies and pro-Russian 
economic and political orientation, Moldova’s integration into the EU would not occur 
soon. However, with the planned expansion of the Union, to include Romania, the EU 
must engage more actively in the solution of the Transdniestrian conflict, which will 
become a matter of the Union’s security.   
Cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and European Union started in 
1994 with the signing of the Partnership and cooperation agreement (PSA).  Moldova’s 
Concept of Foreign Policy interprets the PSA as the first step toward European 
integration.168 The main mechanism of cooperation between the EU and the RM is 
through the Technical Assistance Program (TACIS). This program contributed to the 
democratic development and transition to a market economy of the Republic of Moldova 
and helped to build confidence in the civil society. After 1998, TACIS expanded its range 
of activities to include the initiation of dialog and cooperation between TMR and RM 
authorities. As a result of these activities, in 1999, most of the bridges across the Dniester 
River, which had been destroyed during the military confrontation, were restored. These 
facts demonstrate that the EU had been involved in the process of the development of the 
Republic of Moldova, but did not participate actively in the process of the political 
settlement of the dispute. 
Until now, Moldova was located a considerable distance from the EU. Taking into 
consideration the peaceful environment in the region, EU security was not threatened by 
this conflict. Conflicts in the Balkans were more violent, closer, and more of a threat to 
the Union. With the planed expansion of the EU, to include Romania, its concerns about 
security at the border increased, thus giving the Transdniestrian conflict more priority 
within the organization. Taking in account the character of the Transdniestrian 
administration, discussed in Chapter III, these concerns are justified. As a result, in the 
beginning of 2003, EU member countries, supported by the United States as well as a 
candidate for EU admission, imposed a travel ban on the Transdniestrian leader Igor 
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Smirnov and his two sons. That fact partially facilitated the process of the withdrawal of 
Russian ammunitions from the Transdniestrian region during the first half of 2003. This 
ban was further expanded in 2004. 169 In addition, the European Union is considering the 
possibilities of participating in the peacekeeping operation in Moldova. Thus, in the last 
decade, despite EU involvement in the promotion of democratic principles of government 
and a free market economy in the RM, had very little interest in the Transdniestrian 
conflict. In the future, driven by security concerns, increased by the process of expansion, 
the EU will be involved more actively in the process of political resolution of the conflict 
in the Republic of Moldova.  
In summary, the United States’ interest in the Transdniestrian conflict is mainly 
related to the presence of the Russian arsenal in the region. Its efforts in that region are 
directed toward the nonproliferation of weapons from the Transdniestrian region and the 
total withdrawal of the Russian troops from Moldova, thus eliminating the military 
dominance of the RF over the region. However, because U.S. interests are not at stake in 
that region, the United States will not become directly involved in this conflict, but will 
act indirectly through the OSCE. EU involvement in the solution of the Transdniestrian 
conflict is mainly based on the security concerns. With the extension of the organization, 
the EU would be interested in resolving the conflict on their border, thus preserving their 
security. In that context, the EU can become directly involved in the process of 
negotiations, and in the future can participate in the peacekeeping mission in Moldova, 
thus acting as a counterbalance to the Russian presence. 
D. INVOLVEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND 
COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
The role of the OSCE in the process of negotiations is very important, mainly 
because it is the only Western organization directly involved in the peace-negotiation 
process, and under whose umbrella these negotiations are taking place. Thus, most efforts 
of the Western democracies are channeled through the OSCE. The major success of the  
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OSCE in the process of negotiation is its capability to bring the parties to the negotiation 
table. However, most of the agreements achieved by the conflicting parties under OSCE 
mediation had not been implemented.  
This section argues that the OSCE is trying to build a compromise suitable to all 
parties. However, the success of OSCE activities and initiatives in the Transdniestrian 
conflict regulating process is limited to actions that are not contrary to the general 
direction of the Russian policy in the region, thus diminishing its credibility and 
efficiency. The main explanations are the OSCE’s three weak points that minimize its 
conflict-regulating capabilities: this organization’s decisions made by consensus, no 
reinforcement capabilities and limited financial resources.  
The OSCE mission in the Republic of Moldova was established on February 4, 
1993 and started its activities in April of the same year. On April 13, 1995, the mission 
opened a branch office in Tiraspol.170 The main objectives of the mission are “to 
facilitate the achievement of a lasting political settlement of the conflict, assist parties in 
consolidating the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova along with 
an understanding about a special status for the Transdniestrian region, and ensure 
transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments.”171 
Currently, “the definition of the status of the Transdniestrian region remains the most 
important and challenging task for OSCE mission in Moldova.”172  
However, the OSCE cannot fulfill its mandate without serving the interests of the 
Russian Federation at the same time. As mentioned in the beginning of Chapter I, one of 
the weaknesses of the OSCE is that the decisions in the organization are made by 
consensus. Since the very beginning of the conflict, the Republic of Moldova repeatedly 
declared itself in favor of conducting the peacekeeping mission under the OSCE 
mandate. The first attempt was made during the OSCE Summit in Helsinki on 9-10 July 
1992.  The Moldovan request for OSCE peacekeeping forces was strongly opposed by 
the representatives of the Russian Federation, opting in favor of CIS forces. As a result,                                                  
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the OSCE summit in Helsinki refused the Moldovan request, and on July 21, 1992, the  
Moldovan government had to accept the Russian proposal of the so-called CIS 
peacekeeping forces, who were Russian, Moldovan, and from the unrecognized 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic.173 Another attempt was made in September 1995 at 
the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. However, once again, the OSCE did not 
endorse the Moldovan request.174 These facts suggest that the OSCE practice of making 
decisions by consensus gives the Russian Federation advantage to influence the decisions 
taken by that Organization, a fact that diminishes the OSCE conflict regulating 
capabilities and increases Russia’s dominance over the negotiation process.  
Along those lines, the position of the OSCE was always supporting the integrity 
of the Republic of Moldova and the vast autonomy for the Transdniestrian region. 
However, in July 2002, in Kiev, the mediators, Ukraine and Russia, with help from the 
OSCE, have proposed a document that stipulated a new approach to conflict resolution. 
Article 1 of this document mentioned the Republic of Moldova as a democratic, federal 
state, with the rule of law and a republican form of governance. The proposed document 
was mainly adapted from the Russian Constitution and provoked strong opposition from 
Moldovan civil society and political parties. In addition, the Transdniestrian authorities 
opposed it. As a result of negotiations, by December 2002, the mediators, including the 
OSCE, proposed a Declaration of Intentions, which already stipulated not the OSCE’s 
proposal, but the Transdniestrian version of the “common state,” one built on a 
contractual basis, thus implying more the concept of a confederation rather than a 
federation.  This time, the Moldovan delegation refused to sign the Declaration. The 
motivation was that Transdniestria could later withdraw from any contract reached 
between the two sides and become independent.175 By the end of 2002, the Kiev 
document lost its relevance and became one more document in the negotiation process. 
Thus, by signing the December Declaration of Intentions in support of a contractual  
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federation, the OSCE digressed from its own plan, undermined Moldova’s integrity, and 
as a result, lost Moldova’s credibility. This fact, once again, suggests OSCE domination 
by the RF and its weakness in the process of negotiation.   
The Second weakness of the OSCE affecting the final settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict is its incapability to reinforce its own decisions. As described 
previously, at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit, Russia accepted unconditionally to 
complete withdrawal of its military arsenal, equipment and troops by the end of 2002. 
The results of that summit were very significant for the future settlement of the 
Transdniestrian conflict. However, soon afterwards, Russian officials declared that the 
withdrawal of Russian militaries from the region should be synchronized with the final 
political settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, a fact that raised concerns from the 
Moldovan government. Furthermore, at the 2002 OSCE Ministerial in Porto, this line was 
extended to the end of 2003 and already not “unconditional withdrawal,” but if “provided 
necessary conditions are in place.”176 One year later, at the Ministerial Meeting in 
Maastricht in December 2003, because of the position of the Russian delegation, the 
OSCE already failed to produce any statement regarding the timing of the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the Transdniestrian region. In this context, the OSCE does not 
possess the required potential to reinforce its own decisions, giving the parties the 
necessary insights to ignore the decisions of that Organization and only to comply with 
the decisions serving their interests. This fact is widely used by the Russian Federation in 
the process of resolving the Transdniestrian conflict and the withdrawal of the military 
presence from the region.  
However, despite its weaknesses, the OSCE might also very well serve as a 
mechanism to promote western interests in the region and to influence the Russian plans 
of resolving the dispute strictly on their terms and interests. In November 2003, prior to 
the Maastricht Ministerial Meeting, the Russian Federation developed and proposed their 
plan for a solution to the Transdniestrian conflict without informing the OSCE. If 
implemented, the Russian Federation would achieve their desired goal of justifying a 
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long term presence of Russian troops in the region, and at the same time, possibly saving 
their image on the international level for not honoring their international commitments to 
withdraw their military arsenal and troops from the region by the end of 2003. That plan 
was heavily criticized by Moldovan civil society and opposition parties as well as by 
western analysts. It was also rejected by the OSCE, which had U.S. and EU support.177 
As a result, as mentioned previously, the Moldovan President, pressured by the OSCE 
and civil society, at the last moment refused to sign the already agreed upon document. 
The afore-mentioned case demonstrates two facts. The first is that it demonstrates the 
Russian negligent attitude toward the OSCE, and second, if backed by the strong support 
of the western countries and organizations, the OSCE can act as an effective and 
powerful player in the negotiation process.  
In conclusion, the role of external actors in the process of a political settlement of 
the Transdniestrian conflict is crucial. However, during the last decade, driven by 
personal interests and non-interest, these players, the same as the internal actors, could 
not come to an agreement on the final solution to the conflict. The position of western 
actors is constructed based on their interest in the withdrawal of the Russian military 
presence from the region. In contrast, the Russian Federation has historically dominated 
militarily and economically the region and wants to maintain that dominance in the 
future. In that context, a military presence is one of the major factors in achieving that 
goal. Speaking in realist terms, with the expansion of NATO and the future expansion of 
the EU, military and economic dominance over the region is becoming a strategic issue 
for the Russian Federation, while raising concerns of the Western powers. Thus, taking 
into consideration the current situation, the future solution of the Transdniestrian conflict 
is controversial and difficult to achieve. Thus, all the options currently discussed by the 
internal and external players, separation, a contractual federation and a federation, are not 
going to solve the conflict, but will create more possibilities for the escalation of violence 
and would undermine Moldova’s democratic orientation, sovereignty and independence, 
facts discussed in the next chapter. 
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V. “CIVILIZED DIVORCE” OR “HAPPY MARRIAGE”- 
INPOSSIBLE LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO THE 
TRANSDNIESTRIAN CONFLICT 
…the twentieth century bias against political divorce, that is, secession, is 
just about as strong as the nineteenth century bias against marital divorce. 
178   
Samuel Huntington 
…for federalism or regionalism to unify, not to divide, the polity, it must 
be coupled with policies whose effect is to raise the cost of a successful 
secession, and increase the benefits of association.179 
Timothy Sisk 
 
After the end of the military confrontation in July 1992, the parties involved in the 
conflict and the international players gradually searched for the most plausible solution to 
the Transdniestrian conflict. During the last decade, the Moldovan government as well as 
the Transdniestrian authorities could not find the points of agreement on the main issues 
of a political settlement to the conflict. Since the beginning of the confrontation, Chisinau 
opted for the unitary status of the future Moldova, however, with significant political, 
economic, and cultural autonomy for the Transdniestrian region. The Transdniestrian 
separatist authorities demand their independence or at least a form of contractual 
federation between two equal subjects of international law.  In the last two years, 
Moldova changed its position, accepting the possibility of a federal agreement; however, 
standing on the principle of an asymmetrical federation, while Transdniestria did not 
change its attitudes. Thus, taking into consideration the politico-economic and ideological 
conditions, created in both regions, the final political settlement of the Transdniestrian 
conflict in the near future is very difficult to achieve.  
Given the current situation in the Republic of Moldova, this chapter analyses the 
possibility of three conflict-regulating mechanisms, brought to the negotiation table to 
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create a long-term solution to the conflict: secession, confederation and federation. The 
author argues that none of these mechanisms under current conditions would facilitate a 
long-term solution to the conflict, but might increase the possibility of an escalation of 
violence and confrontation in the region. However, the federal solution has potential in 
case of the implementation of the necessary policies.  First, this chapter will present the 
advantages and limitations of partition. The author will argue that partition would not 
solve the conflict, but, to the contrary, might facilitate the escalation of violence in the 
region with the potential to transform conflict from internal into interstate conflict. 
Second, the confederal arrangements would create the necessary conditions for the 
Transdniestrian region to undermine the contract and to secede, with the consequences 
characteristic of partition. Last, federalism is the form of government most extensively 
accepted as a conflict-regulating tool. It also can serve that purpose in the Transdniestrian 
conflict as well. However, the author argues that, taking into consideration many internal 
and external factors characteristic of the region and to the development of the conflict, in 
the current situation, the federal arrangement, even if achieved, would not last long, thus 
creating further possibilities for conflict. Thus, in order to eliminate the obstacles to final 
integration, the international community and internal actors must promote democratic 
values, the rule of law and a free marked orientation in the region; reduce the benefits of 
the status quo situation and, finally must offer the Transdniestrian region substantial 
politico-economic and cultural autonomy combined with fair representation at the central 
level. With the aforementioned conditions in place, the implementation of the federal 
solution will have a chance to act as a mechanism of unification and conflict-regulation, 
but not as a tool of division and conflict escalation.  
A. SECESSION AND CONFEDERALISM: POSSIBILITIES AND 
LIMITATIONS 
Some proponents of the partition theory argue that the separation of conflicting 
ethnicities might be the only possible long-term solution to civil wars. They acknowledge 
that an ethnic war cannot end without territorial partition and possible movements of the 
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population.180 As discussed in Chapter III, the initial causes of the Transdniestrian 
conflict in the Republic of Moldova have been eliminated. However, over time, Moldova 
and the TMR have developed into two different de facto independent states with slightly 
different political systems and orientation.  Thus, at first glance, the possibilities of 
partition possess some benefits: (1) the Western part of the RM will have a chance to 
increase its economic and political independence from Russia and integrate into the 
European Union; (2) the Transdniestrian region will legally pursue its course of 
integration into the CIS. This subchapter concludes that despite their attractiveness, these 
two possibilities are irrelevant to the solution of the Transdniestrian conflict, and their 
implementation will create new premises for conflict leading to the possible 
destabilization of all South- Eastern Europe.   
1.  Possible Consequences of Partition 
The negative conditions for conflict escalation that secession might create are 
more significant than its benefits.  As a result of secession, ethnic grievances between the 
nationalities within both regions might escalate, the conflict might change its character 
from an intrastate into an interstate conflict, and it will have an encouraging effect on 
other secessionist movements. This combination of factors leads to the belief that 
cessation will not solve the conflict but will further entrench the dispute between 
Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
As Horowitz mention, “Ethnic identity is not static; it changes with the 
environment and especially with the territorial boundaries.”181 Thus, despite the current 
unity of the Transdniestrian population, based not on ethnic identity, but on the old Soviet 
internationalist stereotype, partition of Moldova might trigger unification of population 
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along ethnic lines, thus increasing the potential for future conflict.182  The Republic of 
Moldova, including Transdniestria, is not an ethnically heterogeneous region. In the 
Transdniestrian region, Moldovans comprise 40 percent of the population, Ukrainians 28 
percent, and Russians 25 percent. Despite the proclamation of the languages of all three 
ethnicities as official languages of the TMR, Russian is the only one used in the 
administration and Russians are overrepresented in all administrative structures of the 
government.183 It is unlikely that this situation will change after partition due to the 
structure and orientation of the Transdniestrian administration. In such conditions, 
independence will considerably increase the significance of ethnic divisions. As 
mentioned previously, the idea of unification with Ukraine is becoming popular within 
Transdniestrian Ukrainians, a fact that can gain more popularity after independence 
because of the common border and significant economic dependence of Transdniestria 
from the Ukrainian markets. Thus, Moldovans and Ukrainians from the region might 
change their preferences, and therefore, creating an ethnic tension between all groups, 
which might result in open confrontation. Furthermore, the Transdniestrian authoritarian 
government will most probably maintain its form of government after secession, and 
might repress its minorities, creating the possibility for interstate confrontation.184 In 
addition, cessation might affect the behavior of the Gagauz minority in the southern part 
of Moldova, which also has the highest potential of evolving into a conflict with the 
central Moldovan authorities. Thus, the partition of the RM into two independent states 
will not resolve the conflict, but have a real chance to trigger ethnic grievances within the 
Transdniestrian population as well as the conflict between the Chisinau authorities and 
the Gagauz minority in the southern part of Moldova. 
Second, statistically, the relationship between the secessionist region and the 
rump state do not promise to be harmonious.185 The future relationship between 
Transdniestria and Moldova will also be contentious because Transdniestria will 
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constitute a large part of the industrial potential of Moldova and by the attitudes of the 
elites from both regions.  As discussed in Chapter III, Transdniestria possesses 2/3 of the 
total of Moldova’s industrial enterprises, and its geographical location allows it to 
exercise total control over the economic exchange of Moldova with the CIS countries. In 
that context, the Republic of Moldova will not easily abandon its claims over that region, 
thus straining the situation between them. In addition, any authoritarian political regime 
is characterized by the perception of an external threat and the presence of a real 
enemy.186 In this case, the Transdniestrian authorities will further promote the perception 
of a pan-Romanian threat, and Moldova must face that threat. In this context, it is highly 
probable that the conflict between Transdniestria and Moldova could now  escalate into 
an armed confrontation, between the two states, thus changing the character of the 
conflict from an intrastate to an interstate conflict. 
The last argument against partition is that it will reward the Transdniestrian 
position during the last decade, thus providing a good example for other separatist 
movements, especially in the post Soviet regions. As Horowitz mentions, “The example 
of one movement (separatist) cannot create separatist sentiment where it does not exist; 
… But the strength of a movement, particularly one supported by external aid, can propel 
other separatists into action by convincing of the plausibility of success or of concessions 
short of success.”187 Crimea, Chechnya, and Kosovo are the regions that already 
experience secessionist inspirations. However, a potential threat for the escalation of the 
Hungarian minority movement in Romania and the Gagauz minority within Moldova 
exists.188 Thus, partition of the Republic of Moldova might encourage other secessionist 
movements, thus destabilizing the security situation not only around Moldova, but also in 
other regions, especially in South-Eastern Europe. 
To summarize, partition of the Republic of Moldova would benefit the 
Transdniestrian elites, but will not bring the conflict between the Transdniestrian and 
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Moldovan administrations any closer to its final resolution. Moreover, through partition, 
the conflict has the potential to escalate and transform into an intrastate conflict. In 
addition, the partition of Moldova will have an encouraging effect on the secessionist 
movements all over the world, thus the international community strictly opposes that 
method of conflict regulations and applies it with the greatest of caution.  
2.  Confederalism or the Same Partition? 
Confederalism is often an intermediate stage between federalism and 
independence or vice versa from independence to federation. The main distinction 
between federalism and confederalism is that in a confederation, sovereignty rests within 
the consisting states (or regions); while in federations, sovereignty is shared between the 
center and the regions. In this context, the author argues that a confederal solution is only 
a pretext for recognition of the Transdniestrian administration by the international 
community, and afterwards, to compromise the contract and secede.  
As mentioned by Steven Roper, “Transdniestria wants to move from unitary to 
confederal state, a process that has never occurred.”189 In this context, a confederal 
solution implies recognition of the sovereignty of the Transdniestrian region. For this 
reason, the Transdniestrian administration is promoting the idea of establishing a 
confederation between Serbia and Montenegro, which implies possible revision of a 
contract at certain times, and the maintenance of each state attributes, including its own 
armies, own police forces, and currency. The central authorities of the confederated state 
will mainly conduct only their foreign policy together, resulting in a deadlock for 
Moldova’s development and an intensification of the conflict.  
The RM does not support the confederal solution of the conflict. In case of the 
establishment of the confederal agreements as described previously, the Republic of 
Moldova will still not benefit very much economically and politically from the reunion 
because Transdniestria will maintain the same independent control over the region’s 
resources, but now legally. At the same time, Moldova must coordinate its policies and 
course of development in accordance with the interests of the Transdniestrian authorities. 
Under such conditions, democratic development, a free market economy and integration 
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into the EU will become a dream for the Moldovan population, because the authoritarian, 
old Soviet style, criminal Tiraspol administration will possibly be able to block any 
aspirations of Moldova’s western-oriented development. However, Moldovan society 
will resist these tendencies, which has some experience in democratic development. That 
resistance will certainly trigger the conflict in the society, as a result, between the 
Chisinau and Tiraspol administrations, thus providing the Transdniestrian authorities the 
needed pretext to jeopardize the contract and secession process, which as argued 
previously, might escalate the conflict. Thus, finding a final solution to the 
Transdniestrian conflict in confederal arrangements between the RM and TMR will not 
resolve the situation in that region, but will prepare the required basis for Transdniestria’s 
final secession, with the potential for an escalation of the conflict, as described in the 
previous section.  
In summary, the position of the Transdniestrian administration is for partition of 
the Republic of Moldova or a confederal agreement between the parties in conflict. 
However, even if achieved, these mechanisms will not eliminate the conflict but will 
create the necessary preconditions for its escalation. Despite some benefits, which 
partition might bring to both parties, its costs are more significant not only for the region 
but also for the international community. As a result of partition, the ethnic grievances 
might escalate on both sides, the conflict might change its character from an intrastate 
into an interstate conflict, and it will have an encouraging effect on other secessionist 
movements. A confederal agreement will emphasize recognition of Transdniestria as a 
subject of the international law, a factor used by its administration to jeopardize the 
contract between the two sides and, in the end secede, which will have the same effect as 
partition.     
B. POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SOLUTION 
In contrast to secession, autonomy and federalism are viewed as some of the 
major tools for resolving ethnic and internal conflicts. However, federalism has the 
potential not only to resolve the conflict, but also in some circumstances, to escalate it or 
to create a new one. In this context, this section analyses the theoretical pros and cons of 
the federal system as a conflict regulating mechanism and possible outcome of the federal 
arrangements if applied to the Transdniestrian conflict in the current situation. This 
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section argues that the solution to the Transdniestrian conflict after a decade of de facto 
independent development of both regions cannot be achieved without according 
Transdniestria the substantial possibility to exercise power at the center. In this context, 
the federal arrangement between Tiraspol and Chisinau would be the most plausible 
solution to the conflict, if both regions would want to integrate. However, the authors 
argues that in the current situation, the federalization of Moldova will not diminish the 
conflict, but will create a situation of political stagnation, democratic drawback, and 
further dependency on Russia, factors that might provoke further escalation of the 
conflict. Thus, internal actors as well as the international community first must direct 
their efforts toward the creation of the necessary conditions for federal agreements to last, 
and afterwards, only to pursue a policy of federalism. Otherwise, Moldovan federalism is 
condemned to failure from its very beginning. 
1. Possibilities and Limitations of the Federal Solution: Theoretical 
Approach 
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that political and administrative 
decentralization might contribute to the management of the political conflict.190 Among 
the methods of dividing territories, federalism is the most applicable, because of its 
conflict-regulating effects. Nancy Bermeo reinforces that dispute arguing that federal 
systems provide more settings for peaceful bargaining by building more layers of 
government. These systems also at least give some regional elites a greater stake in 
existing political institutions.191 
In fact, many scholars including Smith, Duchacek, Riker, Lijphart, Przeworski, 
and Sisk support the idea that federalism, as a method of ethno-territorial conflict 
settlement, indeed is the best method for achieving long-term successful results. In 
federal arrangements, the central government has specific areas of authority, the units 
have some degree of autonomy and both levels of government have limited coordinated 
powers. 
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Horowitz mentions four major positive functions of federalism: (1) combined 
with the electoral system, it can encourage party proliferation, which also might facilitate 
coalition building across groups; (2) the politics at the local level can serve as a training 
ground for the politics at the higher level; (3) federalism disperses conflict at the center 
by resolving some of the issues at the regional level; (4) it creates difficulties for parties 
to achieve hegemony at the central level-, and would be difficult for any of them to 
challenge all constituent regions.192 Thus, devolving power enhances autonomy within 
one national unit; multiplies the number of power positions and thus lessens the stakes of 
controlling power at the center, which in turn, lessens the zero-sum nature of unitary 
systems. The most important fact is that in federal arrangements neither the center nor the 
regions can amend the arrangement without mutual consent.193 These factors create 
possibilities for peaceful management of the ethnic and civil disputes in the short, as well 
as, in the long run.   
However, federalism is not an “innocent child”. It also has many pitfalls that can 
create problems. For one, federalism has costs. It creates a duplication of functions, 
increases expenses on building state capitals, and might create conditions for civil 
servants to serve only in their home regions, thus creating possibilities for discrimination. 
In addition, the decision–making process in the federal states is slower and more 
complicated. However, the most important drawback of the federal arrangements is that 
they can “foster the very secession they aimed to prevent.”194 In case of a strong central 
authority, the center can take the lead in making and implementing the appropriate 
decisions. Nevertheless, in cases of weak central power, devolution is a matter of bilateral 
agreements, and in most of the situations, is very fragile.195 Thus, for federal 
arrangements to work, commitment and patience are necessary conditions.  
In order for federal arrangements to work as a conflict regulating mechanism, and 
not to fail, there should be sufficient political-ideological commitment to the idea of a 
federation. Thus, “the leaders and their followers must ‘feel federal,” which includes the                                                  
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loyalty of the general population to the national unity, belief in territorial integrity, and 
ideological commitment to the idea of a federation for its own sake.196 Otherwise, the 
parties will stay federal until they reach their goals, in many cases, the acquisition of 
independence or the strengthening of the economic situation, after which the federation 
has a high chance of failure with a possible escalation of conflict. Thus, “unless there is 
some factor or set of factors which clearly and inexorably push in the direction of 
commonality, then the pressures of asymmetry will increasingly present themselves, 
making continued federal existence impossible.”197 
In summary, federal arrangements can facilitate conflict regulation. At the same 
time, if the politico-ideological commitment of the population and elites is not directed 
toward working together, but is inspired by other goals, or outside parties impose the 
solution, this federation will not last long, and in the end, might result in an escalation of 
the conflict.  
2. The Consequences of Moldova’s Federalization 
The option of federalization of the Republic of Moldova was introduced by the 
OSCE in 1992. Many projects of federalism had been proposed to the parties in the 
conflict since then. However, none of these plans satisfied the interests of both parties. 
The author argues that the federal arrangement in the current politico-economic 
conditions of the Republic of Moldova, including the Transdniestrian region, will not 
resolve the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol, but will escalate the conflict. The 
main causes of this situation are that the population does not support the federal ideas, the 
leaders have different goals and expectations from the federalization, the orientation of 
the political and economic development of these regions are different, and the 
international community is dispersed on that subject as well. In addition, in both regions, 
the governments are corrupt, the poverty level is increasing, and official policies restrict 
democratic development and the free media.  Under such conditions, federalism cannot 
serve as a tool for unification. 
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First, at the mass level, there is no substantial support for the idea of 
federalization. This opposition is mostly based on the lack of knowledge of what 
constitutes a federation. A poll conducted in April –May 2003 in the Republic of 
Moldova (excluding the Transdniestrian region) revealed that only 16 percent of the 
population supports the idea of the federation, while 28 percent reject it categorically. 
Meanwhile, 61 percent do not know what a federal state means.198 The percentage of the 
population that rejects federal ideas is increasing.199 There is no available comparable 
information on the opinion of the Transdniestrian population. However, in 2001, 34.9 
percent of the Transdniestrian population considered itself first and foremost, citizens of 
Transdniestria, 13.9 percent considered itself inhabitants of their locality, and only 4.4 
percent consider itself citizens of Moldova.200 From that data, it is possible to conclude 
that very few people of the Transdniestrian region are loyal to the Moldovan national 
unity, which could prove problematic if the country were to physically devolve power to 
the Transdniestrian authorities under a federal system. In addition, for federalism to 
work, citizens need to feel loyalty toward national unity and not only to sub-national 
loyalty. Thus, the population of the Republic of Moldova does not know the benefits and 
drawbacks of the federal systems and do not “feel federal.” Under such conditions, the 
creation of a federation cannot serve the purpose of reintegration, but easily might 
escalate the conflict. In that case, the positions of leaders might change the situation, very 
significant for the success of federalization. 
Under such conditions, when the general population resists the federal ideas, the 
ideological commitment of the leaders to the idea of the federation might be transmitted 
to the people, and as a result, serve as a precondition of a successful federation. Both 
leaders, Vladimir Voronin, the President of the Republic of Moldova, and Igor Smirnov, 
the leader of the Transdniestrian administration have great support from the population. 
In recent polls, the population in the western part of Moldova mentioned Vladimir 
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Voronin as the most popular political figure (38 percent of the respondents) last year and 
more than half (60 percent) expressed their trust in him.201  The Transdniestrian leader, 
Igor Smirnov, was reelected in December 2001, obtaining 80 percent of the votes from a 
total of 65 percent of electors who showed up to vote.202 In addition, both leaders have 
total control over the legislatures and executives of these two regions, and their parties 
are in position to win next year’s elections. Thus, they may create the necessary 
conditions for the development of a durable federation. 
However, the leaders of these two entities are also dispersed on the future goals 
and forms of the federal agreement. Igor Smirnov is of the position of accepting partition, 
or as a last resort, contractual federation between two equal subjects of the international 
law, thus he and his administration is not interested in the promotion of the national unity 
of these two entities.203 Taking into consideration that in the Tiraspol administration are 
the same leaders as at the beginning of confrontation and their attitudes during the last 
decade it is obvious that the goal of the administration is to enter in an agreement with 
Moldova, which will not be hard to abolish. As a result, they will obtain the recognition 
of the international community and independence.  
The Communist president of the Republic of Moldova is in the position to neglect 
the Transdniestrian leader, and they have not met since 2001. In addition, the Chisinau 
administration, after the election of the Communist majority, is undermining the 
democratic course of development in favor of a more authoritarian rule, but federalism is 
the devolution of power, which cannot be fully implemented without a democratic form 
of government. Under such conditions, the expectation is that in case of the federalization 
of Moldova, this Communist administration will also undermine the autonomy of the 
Transdniestrian region, a fact that cannot facilitate the federal aspirations of the  
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Transdniestrian population. Thus, neither Voronin, nor Smirnov are devoted to the idea 
of federalization as such, each looking for better methods to promote its own interest, but 
not the interests of national unity. 
The third negative condition that disfavors the federal option for the settlement of 
the Transdniestrian conflict is the political and economic orientation of these regions. 
Both regions are currently under the Russian sphere of influence and are politically and 
economically oriented and dependent on it. This fact might facilitate the implementation 
of the federal solution. However, the western part of the Republic of Moldova declared 
integration with the European Union its strategic objective for the future and has a free 
market orientation. Despite only theoretical steps made by the Chisinau administration on 
the issue of EU integration and attempts to intimidate the free market mechanisms, this 
course is supported by 57 percent of the population and is constantly gaining more 
support. At the same time, the aforementioned position is not admissible to the 
Transdniestrian leadership. Thus, the federal arrangement, if achieved, might have two 
negative impacts. The first is that it might create a deadlock in the relationship between 
the center and the region over the political and economic development, and, second, the 
authoritarian model might prevail, thus, seriously threatening the democratic and free 
market development of Moldova. Both impacts have the potential to facilitate the 
escalation of the conflict, but not its solution.  
The last negative condition rests at the level of international affaires.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the international community has different interests and 
different levels of involvement in the resolution of the conflict. Russian Federation 
involvement is based on the aspirations of political, economic and military domination of 
the region, while the western powers and organizations are mainly concerned with the 
presence of the Russian military arsenal and troops in the Transdniestrian region.  With 
the enlargement of NATO and the future expansion of the EU, this fact becomes even 
more important. In the case of the federalization of Moldova under the current conditions, 
it is obvious that one of the conditions that must be accepted is the presence of Russian 
troops, leading to changes in Moldova’s status as a neutral country. Introducing the 
peacekeeping operation of the military contingent from the EU countries might challenge 
the dominance of the Russian military in the region. However, currently the Russian and 
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Tiraspol administrations posse such developments, creating tension on NATO and EU 
borders, thus not increasing security in the region, but creating the premises for an 
escalation of the conflict. 
In summary, because of the aforementioned negative conditions, the 
implementation of the federal arrangement in the current politico-economic situation in 
the Republic of Moldova, including the Transdniestrian region, would not integrate the 
country, and as a result, resolve the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol, but will 
escalate the conflict. However, the federal solution might be a good tool for the future 
development of relationships between Tiraspol and Chisinau, if the necessary steps are 
taken to eliminate or diminish the effect of the negative factors discussed previously.  
3. The Necessary Conditions for Federalism  
In the last decade, the Transdniestrian leadership benefited from the status quo 
situation and was used to prolong the process of negotiation. Thus, the author argues that 
in order to achieve a final settlement to the Transdniestrian conflict the benefits of the 
status quo for Transdniestrian authorities have to be reduced, both societies should be 
opened to democratic development, the rule of law and the free market, and finally, 
Transdniestria must be offered a substantial power at the center, and significant 
autonomy in its own affairs. Under these conditions, the federal solution might serve as a 
tool for integration and not dissolution. 
In such circumstances, in order to achieve a political settlement to the 
Transdniestrian conflict, first, internal and external actors must cooperate in creating a 
favorable basis four integration.204 Second, democratic values, the rule of law, and free 
market orientation must be more promoted in the Republic of Moldova, especially in 
Transdniestria. Transdniestria is controlled by an authoritarian regime that limits political 
pluralism to the antireform process. Political opposition to the current leadership is under 
permanent threat from the security services. The elections, conducted in that region, had 
not been monitored by any international or regional organizations. However, the 
consensus is that they were neither free nor fair. The media is also mostly under the  
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control of the Tiraspol administration. Under such conditions, final settlement of the 
conflict might promote the interests of the ruling elites but excluding the broader interests 
of the population. 
The development of a democratic society, the rule of law and free market 
mechanisms will make Moldova more attractive to the Transdniestrian population. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, Moldova, in the last decade, failed to promote efficient 
economic and social policies. As a result, currently the extreme level of poverty, 
corruption, human rights abuse, and insufficient performance of the democratic 
institutions characterize the RM. With the election of the Communist majority in 2001 in 
the Moldovan Parliament, authoritarian insights are also implemented in the rest of the 
Moldovan society. Thus, implementation of the aforementioned tasks would make 
Moldova more attractive to the Transdniestrian population. Accordingly, democratization 
and establishment of the rule of law will open up both societies for the development of 
integrative methods and will diminish the elite’s unilateral control over society. These 
reforms will increase the confidence of population in the process of integration. 
Second, the benefits of the status quo must be reduced. In that context, the 
Transdniestrian authorities must be removed from the legal and illegal revenues, leading 
to the possible continuation of their authoritarian regime. Thus, the establishment of 
common custom posts between Moldova and Ukraine as well as improvements in 
taxation of all goods coming to Transdniestria through Moldova will have a beneficiary 
impact on reducing the benefits of the status quo. The OSCE, EU and other international 
organization might substantially contribute in training Moldova’s and Ukrainian custom 
services, and if Transdniestria will cooperate, it should be involved in such training also.  
One more possibility for the international players to influence the status quo is to 
continue the ban on travel of the Transdniestrian leadership. The restriction imposed by 
EU countries, and supported by the United States and other non EU member countries on 
the Transdniestrian president and his immediate entourage in 2003 and 2004, affected 
their capabilities on the international level, and as a result, the Transdniestrian leadership 
agreed not to impede the Russian withdrawal of military equipment and ammunition from 
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the region.205 In addition, the withdrawal of the military presence of the Russian 
Federation will result also in the need to open cooperation between Transdniestria and 
Moldova, thus reducing the benefits of the status quo. Thus, strict control over the 
exports and imports of the Transdniestrian region combined with the restriction on travel 
on its political and economic elites, and the evacuation of the Russian militaries from the 
region will decrease the benefits of the status quo and increase the possibilities for 
cooperation, and as a result, for a final solution to the Transdniestrian conflict.   
Considering the fact the Transdniestrian region de facto is an independent state, 
“granting substantial autonomy to Transdniestria without giving it an incentive to 
participate in politics at the center would ensure continued separation.”206 In this context, 
federalism might be a good solution for the final political settlement of this conflict. An 
asymmetric federation with substantial autonomy of the Transdniestrian region might be 
a good tool for final integration. However, as Timothy Sisk mentions, “for federalism or 
regionalism to unify, not to divide, the polity, it must be coupled with policies whose 
effect is to raise the cost of a successful secession, and increase the benefits of 
association.”207 In this context, due to the different path of the development of the 
Transdniestrian region from the rest of Moldova, the Transdniestrian region must have 
significant control over its resources, revenues and cultural development.  
In summary, the Chisinau administration, the Transdniestrian authorities, and the 
international negotiators brought three options to the negotiation table that they believe 
might facilitate the final political settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Moldova: 
secession, a confederal solution and federalism. The Transdniestrian authorities are 
promoting the option of a contractual federation or partition, a solution, which if 
implemented, will legalize Transdniestria as a subject of the international law, but will 
not solve the conflict situation around that region. It is also possible for it to escalate 
ethnic grievances between the populations of the region, transform the character of the 
                                                 
205 However, in the Summer of 2003, the Transdniestrian administration blocked the process of  the 
evacuation of Russian ammunitions and military equipment, demanding compensation of  $100 million 
dollars in gas debt from the Russian Federation for their permission to continue the process. 
206 ICG Europe Report #147, “Moldova: no quick fix,” Chisinau/Brussels, August 2003, 15. 
207 Sisk, Timothy D., Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, (USIP Press, 
Washington, 1996), 51. 
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conflict from an intrastate into an interstate conflict, and encourage the secessionist 
movements in other regions. All these facts combined decry the security situation in 
South-Eastern Europe. Taking into consideration the Transdniestrian position, the 
confederal solution in the end is creating the same situation as partition. These two 
methods are firmly opposed by Moldova and the international community because of the 
aforementioned reasons..   
The federal arrangements between Transdniestria and Moldova might serve as a 
path for the final resolution to the conflict, but current conditions in both regions do not 
permit its implementation, and even if achieved, will not serve the purpose of integration, 
but will lead to the escalation of conflict and further disintegration. It seems that neither 
the Chisinau authorities, nor the Tiraspol administration is ready to pursue such policies. 
Moreover, the Transdniestrian administration believes that it can do better in the case of 
partition, thus decreasing the possibilities of the federal arrangements.208 This situation is 
reinforced by the population’s distrust toward the federal solution and interests of the 
outside players. In such circumstances, federalism, the same as cessation and 
confederalism, would divide, not unite. In order to eliminate the obstacles for final 
integration, the international community and internal actors must promote democratic 
values in the region, the rule of law and a free market orientation, reduce the benefits of 
the status quo situation and, finally offer the Transdniestrian region substantial politico-
economic and cultural autonomy combine with fair representation at the central level.  
                                                 
208 “Liderul transnistrean considera ca trebuie continuat procesul de negocieri cu Chisinaul, dar el nu 
este impotriva unui ‘divort civilizat,” INFOTAG, March 22, 2004, available at 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzed the causes and evolution of the Transdniestrian conflict and 
the capability of three conflict-regulating methods, given the current politico-economic 
and social situation in the region and positions of players in the process of negotiation, to 
solve the Transdniestrian dispute: secession, confederalism and federalism.  
The conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova is one of 
the conflicts that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has transformed over 
time and is still not resolved after more than a decade of negotiations. Many scholars and 
political leaders from both conflicting parties reject the claim that this was an ethnic 
conflict. This thesis argued that it was an ethnic conflict, which, however over time, lost 
its ethnic aspect and transformed into a politico-economic conflict. The conflict erupted 
because of the competition among old party and administrative nomenclatura and the new 
nationalistically oriented elite, fighting over the division of the Soviet state and 
redistribution of political and economic benefits. However, in their initial fight for power, 
the elites mobilized the instrumental and primordial grievances of the population, thus 
lending an ethnic aspect to the confrontation.  
In the last two centuries, the area between Prut and Dniester many times changed 
hands, first between the Russian Empire and Moldovan Principalities and later between 
the Soviet Union and Romania. In their struggle for the hearts and minds of the 
population of that territory, these states accordingly implemented the policies of 
Russification, Sovietization and Romanization. As a result, the population of Bessarabia, 
and later MSSR, was always dispersed and did not have a sense of unity of identity.  
However, the biggest impact, which in the end the elites manipulated, was the creation of 
two different identities in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic during the Soviet era. 
The Transdniestrian population was more inclined toward Soviet internationalism, while 
the rest of Moldova identified itself with the Republic of Moldova, not the Soviet Union 
or Romania., a factor that was very well manipulated by the elites in order to secure their 
political and economic positions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
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The liberalization of political life in the Soviet Union contributed to the formation 
of the Moldovan “informal organizations” in the summer of 1988. These organizations 
were mostly oriented toward cultural awareness and were the first organized opposition 
to the Moldovan Communist Party. In the beginning, these movements were more 
ethnically inclusive than exclusive. Leaders of these movements were oriented toward the 
mobilization of all citizens of MSSR toward democratization, restructuring and 
transparency. The main reason for such widespread support was often not the national 
sentiment of those actors but mainly a possibility to secure or increase their own political 
and economic security in the difficult years of transition from the authoritarian power of 
the Soviet government to a situation yet unknown to the population. 
The introduction of the Language Law in August 1989, which made Moldovan 
the official language of the Republic, and pro-Romanian inspirations of some newly 
elected politicians threatened the lifestyle of the Transdniestrian population, which, as 
discussed previously, was heavily dependent on the connections with the Soviet center, 
and of the Soviet pragmatic nomenclatura, who did not want to accept any changes and 
were devoted to the Communist ideology. Threatened by the aforementioned movements 
and supported by the Russian nationalists and militaries, the Transdniestrian elites 
manipulated the population in the region toward a continuous affiliation with the Soviet 
Union and resistance to the new changes, introduced by the newly emerging elites. The 
Tiraspol administration announced its independence from Moldova, created irregular 
military formations, and took control of the government institutions on the Left bank of 
the Dniester River, thus undermining the legal authority of the Moldovan government in 
that region.  
The new emerged indigenous elites, at the same time, saw the opportunity to 
escape from the control of the center, and directly steer the country in another direction. 
The demands and actions of the Transdniestrian traditional authorities were seen by these 
elites and the rest of the Moldovan population as an attempt to maintain the old regime 
and old ruling elites. This situation created an intergroup security dilemma, which in the 
end, escalated to the point of military confrontation. Russian interests in maintaining 
political, economic and military domination over the region is an important intervening 
variable for the escalation of the conflict into a military confrontation. Direct Russian 
111 
political, economic and military support of the Tiraspol administration encouraged the 
secessionist elites to take more aggressive actions against the legal Moldovan 
government and to establish authoritarian control over the Transdniestrian region. 
Over time, all ethnic causes of this conflict had been eliminated, thus creating the 
necessary conditions for a final political settlement of conflict. The Moldovan 
administration changed the language law in 1994, Moldova’s constitution assured its 
independent course of development, rather than integration with Romania, Moldova 
joined the CIS community, and agreed to synchronize the Russian ammunition 
withdrawal by offering Transdniestria autonomous status. However, this is not the case. 
As Barbara F. Walter mentions,  
Resolving a civil war is never simply a matter of reaching a bargain and 
then instituting a ceasefire. To be successful, a civil war peace settlement 
must consolidate the previously warring factions into a single state, build a 
new government capable of accommodating their interests, and create a 
new national nonpartisan military force.209  
In the case of the Moldovan conflict, the peace accord signed in 1992 between the 
Russian Federation and Moldova and the introduction of peacekeeping forces created a 
status quo situation, which permitted the establishment of two de facto independent 
states: the Republic of Moldova and the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic. This status 
quo situation perfectly suits the economic and political interests of the Transdniestrian 
elites, thus encouraging them to promote a radical position toward the process of 
negotiations and to demand anything but independence, a fact that cannot be accepted by 
the legal Moldovan Government. These divergences led to the permanent deadlock in the 
process of negotiation and impossibility of achieving the final political solution to this 
conflict only through the efforts of the internal players. In such circumstances, the role of 
external actors is more important and is the only path to follow. 
The attitudes of the external actors, involved in the negotiation of the final 
settlement of this dispute are mainly driven by their interests and goals. Russian interests 
toward domination over Moldova did not decrease and, speaking in realists’ terms, with 
                                                 
209 Barbara F. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack 
Snyder, Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, (NY, Columbia University Press, 1999) 38-69, 43 
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the extension of NATO to include Romania in April 2004, the importance of military, 
political and economic influence over that region became a strategic goal of the RF. In 
that context, the Russian Government views the military presence in the region  as an 
important factor for exercising control over the region as well as lately as a security 
factor. Thus, the Russian Federation is of the position to support such a solution to the 
conflict in Moldova, which will permit legalization of its military presence in the region. 
Otherwise, Russia is satisfied with the created status quo situation. 
The Western powers and international organizations oppose the Russian position, 
but have very limited interest in the conflict. The U.S.  interests in the Transdniestrian 
conflict are mostly related to the establishment of effective control over the large Russian 
military arsenal, concentrated on the left bank of the Dniester River and the withdrawal 
of the Russian military presence from the region, thus diminishing Russian military 
dominance over Moldova. European Union involvement in the solution of the 
Transdniestrian conflict is mainly based on the security concerns, and will increase with 
the expansion of the Union to include Romania. However, the Republic of Moldova is 
not one of the main areas of interest of the western powers, thus limiting their implication 
in the conflict only indirectly through the OSCE, and at the same time, trying not to 
disrupt their relations with Russia. Thus, the solution to this conflict, which would 
accommodate the major demands of all parties, is impossible in the current situation. 
Three major conflict regulating tools, secession, federalism and confederalism, 
promoted by various internal and external players to solve the conflict, was brought to the 
attention of negotiators. The unrecognized Transdniestrian government promotes the 
option of the confederation or total secession, while the international community as well 
as the government of the Republic of Moldova is opting for a federal solution. However, 
none of these mechanisms under the current conditions would facilitate conflict 
resolution, and at the same time, maintain Moldova’s sovereignty and democratic course 
of development. Moreover, their implementation under the current conditions will 
escalate the conflict with the potential for a renewal of military action. 
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As a result, the secession ethnic grievances between the nationalities within both 
regions might escalate, the conflict might change its character from an intrastate into an 
interstate conflict, and will have an encouraging effect on other secessionist movements. 
This combination of factors lends itself to the belief that cessation will not solve the 
conflict but will further entrench the dispute between Chisinau and Tiraspol. 
Confederalism is often an intermediate stage between federalism and 
independence or vice versa from independence to federation. The main distinction 
between federalism and confederalism is that in the confederation, sovereignty rests 
within the consisting states (or regions); while in federations, sovereignty is shared 
between the center and the regions. Thus, in the case of the Transdniestrian conflict, the 
confederal solution, proposed by the Tiraspol administration, is only the pretext for its   
international community’s recognition. Afterwards Tiraspol can compromise the contract 
and secede.  
The Federal solution might facilitate the final settlement of the Transdniestrian 
conflict. Federalism is the form of government most extensively accepted as a conflict-
regulating tool. However, taking into consideration the attitudes of the conflicting parties, 
external players and population from both sides of the Dniester River under the current 
conditions, a federal system of government would not be effective. It would create the 
necessary conditions for conflict between pro-Western democratic forces and left-wing 
totalitarian forces, thus not providing the solution to the conflict but escalating it.  
However, in the future, this federal model might be the solution if the necessary 
conditions were created. Thus, in order to eliminate the obstacles for final integration, the 
international community and internal actors must take steps to promote democratic 
values, the rule of law and a free market orientation in the region, to reduce the benefits 
of the status quo situation and, finally to offer the Transdniestrian region substantial 
politico-economic and cultural autonomy combined with fair representation at the central 
level. With the aforementioned conditions in place, the implementation of the federal 
solution will have the chance to act as a mechanism of unification and conflict-regulation,  
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but not as a tool of division and conflict escalation. Until then, the Republic of Moldova 
does not have any chance of finding the final solution to the conflict and dig its way out 
from stagnation, which is drawing this country into extreme poverty and chaos. 
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APPENDIX ABBREVIATIONS 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
EU – European Union 
GUUAM- Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova Cooperative Initiative  
MASSR – Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
MSSR - Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RM – Republic of Moldova 
TMR – Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic  
UN – United Nation Organization 
US – United States of America 
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